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Many important economic questions hinge on the extent to which new goods either crowd out or complement
consumption of existing products. Recent methods for studying new goods are based on demand models
that rule out complementarity by assumption, so their applicability to these questions has been limited.
I develop a new model that relaxes this restriction, and use it to study the specific case of competition
between print and online newspapers. Using new micro data from the Washington DC market, I show
that the major print and online papers appear to be strong complements in the raw data, but that this
is an artifact of unobserved consumer heterogeneity. I estimate that the online paper reduced print
readership by 27,000 per day, at a cost of $5.5 million per year in lost print profits. I find that online
news has provided substantial welfare benefits to consumers and that charging positive online prices
is unlikely to substantially increase firm profits.
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The e⁄ect of new goods on demand for existing products is often uncertain. Convinced that radio
broadcasts were crowding out music sales, record companies in the 1920￿ s waged a series of court
battles demanding high royalties for songs, leading some networks to stop playing major-label music
altogether (Starr 2004, 339; Sterling and Kittross 2002, 214). It soon became apparent, however,
that radio airplay dramatically increased record sales, and by the 1950￿ s record companies were
paying large bribes to get their songs onto disk jockeys￿playlists (Sterling and Kittross 2002, 294).1
More recently, a much-cited Business Week article anticipated that computers would create a ￿pa-
perless o¢ ce.￿Instead, the spread of information technology has sharply increased consumption
of paper (Sellen and Harper 2002). Debate continues in the economics literature about the re-
lationships between free ￿le-sharing services and recorded music (Oberholzer and Strumpf 2004;
Blackburn 2004; Rob and Waldfogel 2004; Zentner 2003), ￿le-sharing services and live concerts
(Mortimer and Sorensen 2005), public and private broadcast channels (Berry and Waldfogel 1999;
Prat and Stromberg 2005), and online and o› ine retailing (Goolsbee 2001; Sinai and Waldfogel
2004).
Measuring the impact of new goods in such settings is important for several reasons. First, it
directly a⁄ects ￿rm decisions. A record company￿ s decision to start licensing music for sale online,
a publisher￿ s decision to sell the ￿lm rights to a novel, a discount retailer￿ s decision to open a new
line of more upscale stores, and many other choices about entry, product positioning, and pricing
depend critically on the demand-side relationships between new and old products. Estimating these
relationships is thus important for both ￿rms themselves and economists seeking to understand ￿rm
behavior. Second, new goods are a major component of increases in the standard of living, and
their omission is a leading source of bias in standard price indices (Bresnahan and Gordon 1997).
Correcting these biases requires accurate estimates of the e⁄ect of new goods on consumer welfare,
which cannot be constructed without knowing the relevant demand elasticities. Finally, the degree
of substitutability between old and new products is an important input to many policy debates,
including those surrounding cable price regulation (Goolsbee and Petrin 2004), deregulation of
local phone markets (Harris and Kraft 1997), and the allowability of cross-media mergers (Federal
Communications Commission 2001).
This paper has two goals. First, I extend existing techniques for estimating the impact of new
goods to allow for the possibility that goods could be either substitutes or complements. Although a
1A similar example concerns the introduction of movies. An 1894 article in Scribners predicted that the availability
of motion-picture and audio versions of novels would lead to the disappearance of printed books (Uzanne 1894).
Today, ￿lm adaptations and novels are widely perceived to be complements, and ￿lm releases are often accompanied
by order-of-magnitude increases in sales of the associated book (Bolonik 2001).
2large recent literature studies the e⁄ect of new goods,2 it has been built on discrete-choice demand
models whose starting assumption is that consumers choose exactly one product from the set
available.3 This means that all goods are restricted a priori to be perfect substitutes at the
individual level. Although this is a reasonable starting point for looking at demand for automobiles
or satellite television, it makes these techniques inappropriate for cases such as those described
above, where the degree of substitutability or complementarity among products are key parameters
of interest. The new discrete demand model I develop permits consumers to choose multiple goods
simultaneously and allows the demand-side relationship between each pair of products to be freely
estimated from the data.
Second, I apply the model to study the impact of online newspapers, a good whose relationship
with a¢ liated print newspapers has been hotly debated.4 I estimate the model using new individual-
level data on the print and online newspaper readership of consumers in Washington DC, and look
at the interaction among the Washington Post, the Post￿ s online edition (the post.com), and the
city￿ s competing daily (the Washington Times). I then use the ￿tted model to ask whether the print
and online newspapers are substitutes or complements, and how the introduction of online news
has a⁄ected the welfare of consumers and newspaper ￿rms. I also address a question of immediate
interest to ￿rms: how pro￿ts would change if they were to charge positive prices for online content
that is currently free.
A central empirical challenge in evaluating the impact of a new good is separating true substi-
tutability or complementarity of goods from correlation in consumer preferences. Observing that
frequent online readers are also frequent print readers, that ￿le sharers buy more CDs, or that com-
puter users consume large volumes of paper might be evidence that the products in question are
complementary. It might also re￿ ect the fact that unobservable tastes for the goods are correlated￿
for example, that some consumers just have a greater taste for news or music overall. In the ￿rst
section below, I analyze this identi￿cation problem in the context of a simple two-good model. I
show that the key elasticities are unidenti￿ed with data on consumer choices and characteristics
2See, for example, Hausman (1997) on the e⁄ect of Apple Cinnamon Cheerios, Greenstein (1997) on the e⁄ect
of PCs, Petrin (2002) on the e⁄ect of minivans, and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) on the e⁄ect of direct broadcast
satellites.
3Several existing papers do estimate discrete choice models in which consumers can choose multiple goods. The
model developed here di⁄ers by allowing goods to range freely from substitutes to complements, and also allowing a
￿ exible form of unobserved consumer heterogeneity. Existing models and their relationship to the present model are
discussed in detail below.
4According to the Wall Street Journal, ￿Newspaper executives are increasingly debating whether free Web access
[to their papers￿content] is siphoning o⁄ readers from their print operations￿(Esterl 2005). See also Walker (2005),
Seelye (2005), and Angwin and Hallinan (2005). Others have argued that an online edition need not crowd out its
a¢ liated print edition and could even complement it (Runnett 2001; Runnett 2002) . The print-online relationship
has been central to the debate surrounding online pricing: ￿A big part of the motivation for newspapers to charge
for their online content is not the revenue it will generate, but the revenue it will save, by slowing the erosion of their
print subscriptions￿(Seelye 2005). The print-online relationship also looms large in the debate about the long-run
viability of print newspapers (Okrent 1999; Henry 2000; Gates 2000).
3alone. I then point out two natural sources of additional information that can aid identi￿cation.
The ￿rst is variables that can be excluded a priori from the utility of one or more goods. In many
settings, price is the obvious candidate. The identi￿cation argument is also valid for non-price
variables, however, and so can be applied where prices do not vary or where the variation is not
exogenous. This is the case in the newspaper market I study, where the price of the online paper is
zero throughout the sample. In the estimation, I exploit variables such as whether consumers have
Internet access at work or a fast connection at home which shift the utility of the online edition
without a⁄ecting the utility of the print edition.5 The second potential source of identi￿cation is
panel data. If correlated unobservables such as taste for news are constant for a given consumer
over time, observing repeated choices by the same consumer can allow us to separate correlation
and complementarity. For example, a consumer who views the content of two papers as comple-
mentary would tend to read both of them on some days and neither on other days. A news junkie
who views the papers as substitutes, on the other hand, would also read both with high frequency,
but would be more likely to read them on alternate days. In the application, I have data on which
newspapers consumers read in the last twenty-four hours, and also in the last ￿ve weekdays, a
limited form of panel data which I exploit in the estimation.
A further challenge is how to translate the utility estimates from the demand model into dollars.
Intuitively, data on consumer choices (combined with exclusion restrictions and panel data) allows
us to estimate how consuming one good a⁄ects the marginal utility of consuming another. To make
welfare statements, we also need to know how consumers trade o⁄ these utils of news consumption
against dollars. This would be straightforward to estimate if we could observe how demand responds
to exogenous variation in prices. I propose an alternative strategy that exploits information from
the supply-side of the market and is valid in the absence of price variation. It is based on a simple
observation: the less sensitive consumers are to prices, the higher the price a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm
would set for its products. Given observable data on marginal costs and advertising revenue, and a
model of the ￿rm￿ s objective function, I can therefore calculate the value of the price elasticity that
would equate the pro￿t-maximizing price of the print newspaper with the price we actually observe.6
This strategy depends on strong assumptions about the form of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function as well
as the accuracy of the observed cost data. But sensitivity analysis con￿rms that the qualitative
conclusions are robust to reasonable alternative assumptions.
The results show that properly accounting for consumer heterogeneity changes the conclusions
substantially. Both reduced-form OLS regressions and a structural model without heterogeneity
suggest that the print and online editions of the Post are strong complements, with the addition of
5Zentner (2003) also uses broadband connections as a shifter of Internet use in studying the impact of ￿le sharing
on music sales.
6Smith (2004) uses a related technique in studying consumer shopping behavior.
4the post.com to the market increasing pro￿ts from the Post print edition by $10.5 million per year.
In contrast, when I estimate the full model with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, I
￿nd that the print and online editions are signi￿cant substitutes. I estimate that raising the price
of the Post by $.10 would increase post.com readership by about 2 percent, and that removing
the post.com from the market entirely would increase readership of the Post by 27,000 readers per
day, or 1.5 percent. The estimated $33.2 million of revenue generated by the post.com comes at a
cost of about $5.5 million in lost Post readership. For consumers, the online edition generated a
per-reader surplus of $.30 per day, implying a total welfare gain of $45 million per year.
The model also informs the debate about the sustainability of free online content (Seelye 2005;
Walker 2005; Gates 2002). I take two approaches to this question. The ￿rst is to assume that
the Post Company may be setting the price of the online edition sub-optimally, and ask whether
pro￿ts could be increased by charging positive prices.7 I ￿nd that for the period under study the
optimal price is indeed positive, at $.20 per day, and that the loss from charging the sub-optimal
price of zero is about $8.8 million per year. The second approach is to suppose that the zero price
is optimal and ask how large transactions costs would have to be to rationalize it. I show that a
zero price would be optimal for any transaction cost greater than or equal to $.13 per day. I also
show that because of growth in online advertising demand, the gain to raising online prices was
virtually eliminated by 2004. This suggests that the zero price may have been part of a rational
forward-looking strategy and is approximately optimal today.
Estimating a structural model of the newspaper market is not, of course, the only possible
approach to studying the impact of online newspapers. I show below that valuable information
can be gleaned by looking at both time series of aggregate newspaper circulation and reduced
form regressions using micro data.8 There are two major bene￿ts to estimating the complete
model, however.9 First, because the model is derived from utility maximization, it takes on all of
the restrictions implied by consumer theory. This means that the estimated parameters can be
used to calculate welfare e⁄ects. It also allows us to obtain meaningful answers to counter-factual
experiments, such as changing the online price, that are outside the variation observed directly
in the data. Second, the model allows multiple forms of identi￿cation to be brought to bear and
combined e¢ ciently in a single estimate. None of the sources of identi￿cation I exploit constitutes
an ideal natural experiment. Taken together, however, they provide a substantial improvement
7Note that the method for calculating the price elasticity described above is based on the assumption that the
price of the print edition is set optimally. The alternative assumptions I entertain are then (i) that only the zero
online price is sub-optimal and (ii) that all prices are set optimally. These assumptions are discussed in more detail
below.
8In particular, linear instrumental variables alone provides strong evidence that the print and online papers are
substitutes rather than complements (as the raw correlations would suggest).
9See also Nevo (2000) and Reiss and Wolak (2005) for a general discussion of the advantages of structural demand
models.
5on the information available in the raw data, lead to sharply di⁄erent conclusions than would be
obtained from naive analysis, and allow us to make progress in understanding a market where the
lack of price variation limits the applicability of standard tools.
The next section analyzes the general problem of identifying substitution patterns in a discrete
demand model with multiple choices, and provides a brief discussion of related discrete-choice meth-
ods. Section 3 introduces the data and presents reduced-form results on the relationship between
print and online demand. Section 4 speci￿es the empirical model and estimation strategy, section
5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Substitution patterns and identi￿cation
2.1 An illustrative model
In this section, I use a simple example to examine identi￿cation of substitution patterns in a
discrete-choice setting where consumers can choose multiple goods. Suppose there are two goods,
labeled A and B, and that consumers can choose at most one unit of each. We observe the choices
of a large population of consumers. For simplicity, I will not write the dependence of the model
on observable characteristics, assuming that all the consumers in the data are ex ante identical
from the econometrician￿ s point of view. The terms below can easily be rewritten as functions of a
vector of observables, and the identi￿cation arguments interpreted as identi￿cation of parameters
conditional on this vector.
We can potentially measure three quantities: PA (the probability of choosing A but not B); PB
(the probability of choosing B but not A); and PAB (the probability of choosing both). The ￿nal
probability￿ choosing neither￿ is linearly dependent so does not provide any additional informa-
tion.
The goal is to estimate the various own and cross-price elasticities. These may in turn be inputs
into the analysis of the welfare from new goods, the e⁄ect of a merger, or the change in pro￿ts from
o⁄ering a di⁄erent mix of products.
Denote the prices of discrete goods A and B by pA and pB. Income not spent on A or B is
used to purchase a continuous composite commodity. Utility from q units of this commodity is ￿q
which enters overall utility linearly. Denote the utility of consuming a bundle r by u0
r. A natural














This is the discrete analogue of the cross-partial of utility, and measures the extent to which the
added utility of consuming good A increases if good B is consumed as well.
6Normalizing utility by u0
0, we can de￿ne:
u0 = 0 (1)
uA = ￿A ￿ ￿pA + ￿A
uB = ￿B ￿ ￿pB + ￿B
uAB = uA + uB + ￿
Here ur = u0
r￿u0
0, ￿A and ￿B are mean utilities, and ￿A and ￿B represent unobservable variation in
utility. I assume that ￿A, ￿B, and ￿ are all constant across consumers. Note that these expressions
use the fact that the di⁄erence between the utility from the composite commodity when good j is
purchased (￿(y ￿ pj)) and when neither good is purchased (￿y) is just ￿￿pj.















The normalization of one of the variance terms to one is without loss of generality since we can
divide all utilities by a constant and not change any of the choice probabilities. The normalization
of the other is purely to simplify exposition.
2.2 Substitution patterns
Let F (u) be the distribution of u = (uA;uB;uAB) implied by the assumptions above. Assuming












I (uAB ￿ 0)I (uAB ￿ uA)I (uAB ￿ uB)dF (u). (2)
A central focus of this paper will be estimating the degree of substitutability or complementarity
among products. Throughout the analysis, I will use the standard modern de￿nition of complements
(substitutes): a negative (positive) compensated cross-price elasticity of demand. Note that the
de￿nition is not based directly on properties of the utility function (see Samuelson 1974 for an
extended discussion). However, I show in this section that in the simple model with two goods
there is an intuitive relationship between complementarity and the sign of the interaction term, ￿.
7Denote expected demand per consumer for goods A and B by QA = PA + PAB and QB =
PB + PAB. Because the quasilinear speci￿cation of utility causes income to drop out, there are no
wealth e⁄ects. The elements of the Slutsky matrix are then just the cross-derivatives of demand,
and so by the standard de￿nition:
De￿nition 1 Goods A and B are substitutes if @QA=@pB > 0, independent if @QA=@pB = 0, and
complements if @QA=@pB < 0.
Figure 1 shows demand for the goods as regions of (uA;uB) space. The ￿rst panel shows the
case of ￿ = 0, the second panel shows the case of ￿ > 0, and the third panel shows the case of
￿ < 0. To see how the model determines the cross-price derivatives, observe ￿rst that increasing
pB is equivalent to shifting probability mass downward. That is, for any point (a;b) in this space,
it increases the probability that uB ￿ b given that uA = a.
Consider the ￿rst panel. Increasing pB causes marginal consumers such as m to switch from
buying the bundle AB to buying A alone. It also causes marginal consumers such as n to switch
from buying B alone to buying neither good. Neither of these changes has any e⁄ect on the demand
for good A, however￿ the increase in PA is exactly o⁄set by a decrease in PAB. This implies that
when ￿ = 0, the cross-derivatives of demand for the products will be @QA=@pB = 0, and they are
therefore independent.
Next, consider the second panel. Increasing pB causes consumers m and n to switch as before.
There will now be consumers such as o, however, who will switch from buying the bundle AB to
buying nothing. This means that the drop in PAB will be larger than the increase in PA, and so
@QA=@pB < 0. In the case of ￿ > 0, therefore, the goods are complements.
In the third panel, there are no consumers indi⁄erent between buying AB and buying neither
good, but consumers such as o are indi⁄erent between buying A alone and buying B alone. In-
creasing pB causes them to switch from buying B to buying A, so that the increase in PA is larger
than the drop in PAB. We therefore ￿nd that ￿ < 0 implies the goods must be substitutes.
This discussion suggests the quite intuitive result that the interaction term ￿ is the key parame-
ter for determining the substitutability of goods in a multivariate discrete choice model. Formally,






[I (uA = uB)I (￿￿ ￿ uA;uB ￿ 0) ￿ I (uA + uB = ￿￿)I (uA ￿ 0)I (uB ￿ 0)]dF (u).
(3)
The ￿rst term inside the integral represents points on the dark diagonal line segment in the third
panel of ￿gure 1, along which consumers are indi⁄erent between buying A alone and B alone.
The second term represents points on the dark diagonal segment in the second panel, along which
consumers are indi⁄erent between the bundle AB and buying neither good.
8Inspection of equation 3 immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 1 Goods A and B are substitutes if ￿ < 0, independent if ￿ = 0, and complements
if ￿ > 0.
While I motivate this result in terms of the thought experiment of changing prices, the appli-
cation below will be to a situation in which the price of one product￿ the online paper￿ is ￿xed at
zero. This does not cause any problems in terms of de￿nition 1, since a price change around zero
is well de￿ned. Furthermore, because utility is quasilinear, the sign of the cross-price derivatives
will be the same as the cross-derivatives with respect to other components of utility. This means
we could run through the same intuition from ￿gure 1 for a shift in non-price dimensions of utility.
Suppose, for example, that good A is a print paper and good B is an online paper. Increasing
the utility of B by improving connection speed or making the Internet available at work will shift
probability mass in the ￿gure upward just as reducing pB would, and the e⁄ect of such a change
on QA will be determined by ￿.
For clarity of exposition, this example was restricted to the case of two goods. Gentzkow (2005)
shows how the intuition extends to the multi-good case. The situation becomes more complex in a
way analogous to standard (continuous) demand theory, but an intuitive link between interaction
terms in utility such as ￿ and substitution patterns continues to hold.
2.3 The outside option
The interpretation of the outside good in this setting is di⁄erent from its interpretation in the
standard multinomial model. In the standard case, the utility of consuming none of the modeled
goods￿ typically indexed as choice zero￿ is implicitly maximized over all goods which are excluded
from the model. If we are modeling demand for cars, for example, the utility of good zero for
consumer i would capture the utility of that consumer￿ s best non-car transportation option. It
would be the maximum of utility from taking the bus, riding the subway, walking, and so forth.
In a model where choosing multiple goods simultaneously is possible, on the other hand, all
choices in the model include such an implicit maximization. In the newspaper application, the data
does not include consumers￿consumption of many news sources such as cable television, radio,
Yahoo news, and so forth. When a consumer in the data is observed to have read the Washington
Post on a particular day, it may be that the Washington Post was her only source of news on that
day, or it may be that she both read the Washington Post and watched half an hour of CNN. What
the econometrician observes is that the maximum utility of bundles that include the Post only is
greater for this consumer than the maximum utility of bundles that include any other combination
of the observed goods.
9One might ask how these unobserved goods will a⁄ect the estimated substitution patterns.
Suppose, for example, that having watched CNN dramatically reduces the marginal utility of
reading the post.com (so that the two are never consumed together) and dramatically increases the
marginal utility of reading the Post print edition (so that the two are always consumed together).
Suppose, further, that reading the Post has no e⁄ect on the marginal utility of reading the post.com.
From the discussion above, we know that if the Post and the post.com were the only two goods in
the market, they would be independent in demand. If CNN is present but unobserved, however,
we would never see the Post and the post.com consumed together, and so would estimate that they
are strong substitutes.
What is important to recognize is that the model￿ s answer in both cases would be correct. In
a world without CNN, increasing the price of the Post would have no e⁄ect on demand for the
post.com. In a world with CNN, on the other hand, increasing the price of the Post would reduce
consumption of both it and CNN, which in turn would increase consumption of the post.com. The
fact that the true substitutability of a pair of products will depend on both their direct interaction
in utility and their indirect interaction via other goods in the market has long been recognized in
classical demand theory (Samuelson 1974; Ogaki 1990). The data on consumption of the Post and
the post.com will allow us to accurately estimate their relationship in demand, whether or not we
have data on consuption of other related goods. However, these estimates will still be conditional
on the set of alternative goods available in the market. The estimates provide the correct quantity
for evaluating the e⁄ect of a price change on ￿rm pro￿ts. The estimated response to removing the
post.com from the choice set will also be correct. The e⁄ects could change, however, if the prices
or characteristics of important unobserved goods changed dramatically, and the data will of course
allow us to say nothing about the relationship between the observed and the unobserved products.
Note that these latter limitations are shared by all discrete-choice demand models.10
2.4 Identi￿cation
Under the assumptions made so far, the model is not identi￿ed. There are three observable data
points and ￿ve independent parameters: ￿A, ￿B, ￿, ￿, and ￿.
The price coe¢ cient ￿ is identi￿ed from choice data alone if and only if there is variation
10A more subtle issue is how the correct functional form of equation 1 will change in the presence of unobserved
third goods. Suppose, for example, that there are three goods A, B, and C, but that only consumption of A and









will actually be estimated will be linear as well. Beyond this, however, there is no obvious relationship between the
functional form of utility with and without the implicit maximization over consumption of C. Of course we really
have no more prior information about the functional form u
0




ACg. Also, it is equally
true in standard discrete choice models that the ￿true￿functional form of utilities changes in complex ways as we vary
the set of outside goods. The question in the current setting as always is whether the functional form is su¢ ciently
￿ exible to capture the important variation in the data.
10in prices. To see this, note that all predicted probabilities would be the same if we replace the
parameters (￿A;￿B;￿) by (￿A + ￿pA;￿B + ￿pB;0). With two observed price vectors, on the other
hand, we gain three additional moments￿ any one of these would be su¢ cient to identify ￿ given
the other parameters of the model.
In situations where there is no usable variation in prices, ￿ must be inferred by introducing an
additional moment from some other source. In the application below, this comes from one ￿rm￿ s
￿rst-order condition. Although only the sums ￿A +￿pA and ￿B +￿pB are identi￿ed from demand
data, there will be a unique ￿ such that the ￿rst-order condition is satis￿ed at the observed price.
The remaining issue is how to separately identify the interaction term, ￿, and the covariance of
the unobservables, ￿. Intuitively, the mean utilities ￿A and ￿B will be identi￿ed by the marginal
probabilities QA and QB. The remaining moment in the data will be how often the goods are
consumed together (whether PAB is high relative to PA and PB). A high value of PAB can be
explained by either a high value of ￿ or a high value of ￿, and there is nothing left in the data to
separate these.
Furthermore, proposition 1 shows that this leaves the substitution patterns in the model severely
unidenti￿ed. Without some additional information, the same data could be ￿t by assuming that the
goods are nearly perfect substitutes (￿ ￿ ￿1 and ￿ high) or nearly perfect complements (￿ ￿ 1
and ￿ low). A model which ￿solves￿the problem by imposing an ad hoc restriction on one of these
two parameters will be unlikely to provide a basis for reliable inference about any quantity in which
substitutability of the goods plays an important role.
There are, of course, many ways that more moments could be added to the data in order to
identify the model. I will brie￿ y discuss two that seem likely to arise frequently in practice and will
play a key role in the application. I assume that the necessary technical conditions are satis￿ed
such that the model is identi￿ed if and only if the number of moments is greater than or equal to
the number of parameters.
The ￿rst possible source of identi￿cation is exclusion restrictions. Suppose in particular that
there is some variable x which is allowed to enter the utility of one good, making the mean utility
of good A, say, ￿A (x), but does not enter either ￿B or ￿. One obvious candidate is the price of
good A. In the newspaper application considered in this paper, there is no price variation, but
there are consumer speci￿c observables such as having Internet access at work that a⁄ect the utility
of online but not print newspapers. Having observations at a second value of such an x (call this
new vector x0) would add three new moments (PA (x0), PB (x0), and PAB (x0)) but only one new
parameter (￿A (x0)). The model would therefore be formally identi￿ed.
Furthermore, the intuitive basis of the identi￿cation is quite strong. Suppose, for example, that
the goods are frequently consumed together (PAB is high relative to PA and PB). If this is the
11result of a high ￿, the goods are complements, and shifting up the utility of good A by moving x
should also increase the probability of consuming good B. If ￿ is zero and the observed pattern is
the result of correlation, the probability of consuming good B should remain unchanged.11
The second possible source of identi￿cation is panel data. Extending the model slightly to
allow for repeated choices over time, assume that the observables (￿A;￿B) are made up of two
components￿ a possibly correlated random e⁄ect term (~ ￿A;~ ￿B) which is constant within consumers
over time, and an additional time-varying component (￿A;￿B), which is assumed to be i.i.d. across
products and time. In the newspaper application, this model would amount to assuming that
unobserved correlation in the utilities of di⁄erent papers is driven by consumer characteristics such
as a general taste for news that are constant over the course of a week, and that the additional
shocks that lead consumers to read on Monday but not Tuesday are uncorrelated.
Now, if we observe each consumer￿ s choice at two di⁄erent points in time, we have increased
the number of moments from three to ￿fteen.12 Under the assumption that (~ ￿A;~ ￿B) is constant
over time, this is su¢ cient for formal identi￿cation of the model parameters, including the full
covariance matrix of the random e⁄ects. Intuitively, the argument is just a variant of the usual
one for the identi￿cation of random e⁄ects from panel data. Suppose again that goods A and
B are frequently consumed together. If this is the result of correlated random e⁄ects, we should
see some consumers likely to consume both and some consumers likely to consume neither, but
conditional on a consumer￿ s average propensity to consume each good the day-to-day variation
should be uncorrelated across goods. If it is the result of a high ￿, on the other hand, the day-
to-day variation should be strongly correlated￿ a given consumer might consume both on one day
and neither on another day but would be unlikely to consume either one alone.
A special case that will be relevant to the application below is one where the data is not a true
panel but includes observations on both a single day￿ s purchases and a summary of purchases over
a longer period of time. For example, suppose that consumers in the two-good model make choices
on two consecutive days. Suppose we observe the actual choice made on day one, but not on day
two. We also observe two dummy variables dA and dB where dj = 1 if product j was chosen at
least once over the two days. This clearly contains less information than a true panel would￿ if
both A and B are chosen on day one, we will have dA = 1 and dB = 1 regardless of the choice on
day two, and the data therefore provides no information on the day two choice. On the other hand,
if neither good was chosen on day one dA and dB will tell us what was chosen on day two exactly.
11Keane (1992) presents monte carlo evidence on the role of this kind of exclusion restriction in identifying the
covariance parameters in a multinomial probit model. Since a multinomial probit model de￿ned over bundles e⁄ec-
tively nests the model of equation 1, this evidence is relevant. He shows that including exclusion restrictions greatly
improves the accuracy of the model.
12With observations at two points in time, the moments would be the probability of each possible combination of
choices over the two periods. When there are four choices, this gives sixteen possible combinations. The number of
moments is one less than this because the probabilities must sum to one.
12Although this is a more limited form of information about choices over time, it can still sepa-
rately identify the covariance matrix of the random e⁄ects and thus distinguish true complemen-
tarity from correlation. To see the intuition for this, consider ￿rst observations on consumers who
chose neither product on day one. The data will allow us to observe exactly what these consumers
chose on day two. If the variance of (~ ￿A;~ ￿B) is small, conditioning on the fact that they chose
neither good on the ￿rst day does not change their choice probabilities on day two￿ we should
expect the latter to be exactly the same as the choice probabilities in the sample as a whole for day
one. If the variance of the random e⁄ects is large, on the other hand, the fact that these consumers
did not purchase on day one would predict that they would also be less likely to purchase on day
two. We can therefore think of these consumers as identifying the variance of the random e⁄ects.
The correlation term will then be identi￿ed by consumers who chose either A or B but not both
on day one. For a consumer who chose A only on day one, we will see dB = 1 if and only if B was
chosen on day two. If the random e⁄ects are strongly positively correlated, observing a choice of
A on day one suggests that the consumer will be relatively more likely to choose B on day two. If
they are negatively correlated, such a consumer should be less likely to choose B on day two.
2.5 Relationship to past literature
The model of equation 1 provides a useful starting point for understanding the existing approaches
in the literature to estimating discrete choices when multiple goods are chosen simultaneously. To
make the discussion concrete, suppose we have micro data on demand for two goods, A and B.
Suppose that the frequency with which the goods are consumed together is high relative to the
frequency with which either is consumed alone. I will discuss how this data would be ￿t by several
existing approaches in the literature.
One approach is the multiple-discrete choice model pioneered by Hendel (1999) and applied by
Dube (2004). These models assume that the data is generated by an aggregation over a number of
individual choice problems, or ￿tasks.￿For example, Hendel (1999) estimates demand for PCs by
corporations. In this case, a task might represent a single employee￿ s computing needs. Each agent
chooses a single good for each task, which makes the task-level problem analogous to equation 1
with ￿AB = ￿1.13 Because the utility from using a given good in one task does not depend on
what goods were chosen for other tasks, aggregating over a large number of these tasks is similar
to aggregating over a population of heterogeneous consumers in a standard multinomial discrete
choice model. The model therefore restricts the goods to be substitutes.14
13Both papers allow consumers to choose multiple units of each good, so the task-level choice is more complicated
than a standard multinomial discrete choice problem. But the utility speci￿cation implies that consumers will choose
at most one type of good for each task.
14A di⁄erent parametric restriction on the ￿ interaction terms underlies the model of Chan (2004). He de￿nes
goods to be a bundle of characteristics, and assumes that the utility of a bundle is a function of the sum of each
13A second approach is the multivariate probit (applied, for example, by Augereau, Greenstein,
and Rysman 2004). Here, consumption of each good is assumed to be driven by a separate probit
equation, with errors possibly correlated across equations. This is exactly equivalent to equation
1 with ￿AB = 0, and so restricts all goods to be independent in demand (all cross-elasticities are
zero).15
A third approach is to estimate a logit or nested logit model de￿ned over the set all possible
bundles. Papers that take this approach include Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) and Man-
ski and Sherman (1980). Because each bundle￿ s utility is parameterized separately, the ￿AB term
could be estimated freely (although both of these papers restrict the interactions as a parametric
function of the goods￿characteristics). The unobservables, on the other hand, are either assumed
to be uncorrelated (in the case of the logit) or have a correlation structure dictated by the nests,
which is too restrictive to allow the kind of correlation implied by equation 1 with ￿ 6= 0. Given
the hypothetical data, we would expect such a model to ￿nd ￿AB > 0, implying that the goods
would be complements.
The main di⁄erence between the current framework and those that exist in the literature is thus
a more ￿ exible speci￿cation of the way goods interact in utility and the correlation of unobservable
tastes. The functional forms for observable and unobservable utility that have been used in the past
impose strong restrictions on substitution patterns￿ for a given set of observations, one could choose
models from the literature that would imply that the goods are strong substitutes, independent, or
strong complements. In certain settings, such assumptions will be justi￿ed, and making them has
the obvious bene￿t of allowing the researcher to analyze larger choice sets than the one considered
here. In other settings, the necessary prior information is not available, and it will be critical to
allow a more ￿ exible structure and address directly how substitution patterns are identi￿ed by the
data.
characteristic across the di⁄erent goods. The bundle consisting of a bottle of Diet Coke and a bottle of Diet Pepsi,
for example, consists of two units of the characteristic ￿cola,￿ two units of the characteristic ￿diet,￿ and one unit
each of the characteristics ￿Coke￿and ￿Pepsi.￿Because utility is assumed in the main speci￿cation to be concave in
the total of each characteristic, it is sub-additive across goods, meaning ￿AB < 0. This would again imply that the
products must be substitutes. (Chan does ￿nd complementarity among some products in a speci￿cation with many
goods which appears to result from indirect substitution e⁄ects as described above.)
15The discrete-continuous framework of Kim, Allenby, and Rossi (2002) also assumes the equivalent of ￿AB = 0
(that the utility of a bundle is simply the sum of the utilities of the underlying goods). The conclusion that the goods
must be independent does not hold here, however, because the utility of the outside composite commodity is allowed
to be concave rather than linear. This implies that all goods will be substitutes, though with a single curvature
parameter governing all the cross-elasticities as well as the elasticity of total expenditure on the inside goods.
143 A ￿rst look at the data
3.1 The Scarborough survey
The empirical analysis is based on a survey of 16,179 adults in the Washington DC Designated
Market Area (DMA), conducted between March 2000 and February 2003 by Scarborough Research.
The Washington DC DMA includes the District of Columbia itself, as well as neighboring counties
in Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. The data include a range of individual
and household characteristics of the respondents, as well as information on various consumption
decisions. Most importantly for the current application, these include an enumeration of all local
print newspapers read over the last twenty-four hours and ￿ve weekdays, as well as readership of
the major local online newspapers over the same periods.
Washington DC has two major daily newspapers, the Washington Post and the Washington
Times. The former is dominant: average daily readership of the Post was 1.8 million in 2000-
2003, compared to 256,000 for the Times. The two papers also di⁄er in their perceived political
stance with the Times generally thought to be more conservative than the Post. The main online
newspaper is the post.com, which had an average of 406,000 area readers per day.16
I will de￿ne the goods in the model to be daily editions of the Post, the Times, and the post.com.
The outside alternative will include other print and online newspapers, other news sources such as
television and radio, and the choice not to consume news at all. As noted above, all choices in the
model represent an implicit maximization over these outside goods￿ the observed choice to read
the Post only, for example, includes consumers who both read the Post and the New York Times,
or both read the Post and watched TV news.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the Scarborough data along with corresponding census
￿gures for the Washington DC DMA. The survey is approximately a .4 percent sample, and is
broadly representative, with some over-representation of older, more educated, and more wealthy
individuals, and some under-representation of minorities. The survey includes sampling weights to
correct for this over-representation. I will use the un-weighted data for estimation, and use weights
when I simulate aggregate e⁄ects.17
16Readership ￿gures are based on the Scarborough survey. Note that these readership numbers are larger than
circulation ￿gures for the same papers, re￿ ecting the fact that multiple consumers read each copy. The Times also
has an online edition, the washingtontimes.com, but its readership is very small and there are only 373 readers in my
sample. In practice, this turns out to be too few to accurately estimate utility parameters for the washingtontimes.com,
and so I omit it from the analysis.
17In addition to including weights, the raw Scarborough data also corrects for respondents who ￿lled out an initial
questionnaire but not the longer survey by ￿lling in a small number of these consumers￿survey responses using the
responses of other consumers matched by demographics. These ￿ascribed￿observations are easy to identify because
the probability of two respondents with the same sampling weight matching perfectly on all survey responses by
random chance is very low. I omit these observations (about 6 percent of the initial sample) in all estimation, but
include them in the policy simulations in order to get the correct match to aggregate demographics.
153.2 Reduced-form results
Figure 2 displays the daily readership of Washington DC￿ s print and online newspapers since 1961.
The ￿rst thing to note is that the rapid increase in post.com readership since its introduction in 1996
has been accompanied by a drop in Post readership. A simple OLS regression of Post readership
since 1984 on post.com readership and a time trend gives a signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cient, and
suggests that it takes four post.com readers to reduce Post readership by one. Although it might be
tempting to take this as direct evidence that the print and online editions are substitutes, several
factors make such a conclusion dubious. First, the downward trend in Post readership begins
in 1994, two years before the post.com was introduced, and it does not accelerate signi￿cantly
thereafter. Second, newspaper readership has been declining for many years nationally and there
are many demand-side trends that could account for the downward slide of the Post. Finally, the
downward trend in Post readership coincides with a series of increases in the Post￿ s subscription
price and it would be di¢ cult to separate these price e⁄ects from the e⁄ect of the post.com using
aggregate time series alone. For these reasons, getting a handle on the impact of the post.com will
require bringing additional information to bear on the problem.
Figure 2 also provides evidence about the extent of substitutability among di⁄erent print papers.
The exits of the Washington Star in 1981 and the Washington News in 1973 both led to increases
in the readership of the remaining papers, suggesting some substitutability. In both cases, however,
the exits led to declines in total readership, and fewer than half of the readers of the exiting paper
appear to have switched to one of the remaining papers. In terms of the Post and the Times, the
time-series provides no evidence of a negative relationship. A linear regression of Post readership
on Times readership actually gives a positive coe¢ cient (though insigni￿cant), even when a time
trend is included. Of course, these regressions do not distinguish substitutability from changes in
demand or characteristics of the products over time.
Turning to the Scarborough micro data, the ￿rst thing to note is that readership of multiple
papers is common. 48 percent of consumers reported reading at least one of the Post, Times, or
post.com in the last twenty-four hours. Of these consumers, 18 percent reported reading two of the
papers, and 1 percent reported reading all three. Over a ￿ve-day window, 65 percent of consumers
read at least one of the papers; of these 27 percent read two papers and 3 percent read all three.
Table 2 reports the number of consumers reading the Post and the post.com over twenty-four hour
and ￿ve-day windows. It is immediately clear from this table that combined readership of print and
online is common. In fact, the fraction of online readers who read print is higher than the fraction
of those who do not read online.
Table 3 reports raw and partial correlation coe¢ cients for each pair of papers. The partial
correlations control for age, sex, education, industry of employment, employment status, income,
16political party, date of survey, location of residence within the DMA, and number of missing values
in the survey.18 Readership of the Post and post.com are signi￿cantly positively correlated over
both twenty-four-hour and ￿ve-day windows. Controlling for observable characteristics reduces this
correlation by about two thirds, but it remains signi￿cant at the .1 percent level. The correlation
between readership of the Post and the Times is also signi￿cantly positive in the raw data, but
this disappears when controls are added. The partial correlation is zero over a twenty-four-hour
window, and signi￿cantly negative over a ￿ve-day window. The correlation between the Times and
the post.com is never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
What can we conclude from these results? The basic fact in the raw data is that a consumer
who reads any one paper is on average more likely to have also read a second paper. If all het-
erogeneity in utilities was uncorrelated across papers, this would be strong evidence that all three
are complements. An alternative explanation is that the kind of consumers who get a lot of value
from reading the Post also get a lot of value from reading the post.com and the Times. The fact
that the positive correlation decreases dramatically when we partial out the e⁄ect of observables
provides direct evidence for this. The question is whether the remaining correlation￿ in particular
the positive correlation between the Post and the post.com￿ represents true complementarity or
additional correlation in tastes which is unobserved.
To separate these stories, I will exploit variables that should have a strong e⁄ect on the utility
of reading the online newspaper but should have no direct e⁄ect on the utility from reading in
print. First, I include a dummy variable measuring whether the consumer has Internet access at
work. Being able to access the Internet at work clearly reduces the time cost of reading online,
but should not directly a⁄ect the utility from reading in print. Second, I include two dummy
variables indicating whether the consumer uses the Internet for either work-related or education-
related tasks. Performing these tasks should lead consumers to be more familiar with the Internet
and spend more time at their computers, both of which should decrease the e⁄ective cost of reading
news online, but not directly a⁄ect the utility of print reading. Finally, I include a dummy variable
indicating whether the consumer has a high-speed Internet connection at home. This too should
increase the utility from reading online without directly a⁄ecting the utility from reading in print.
Note that an important limitation of the data is that I do not have variables which could be
assumed to shift the utility of the Post print edition but not the Times print edition or vice versa.
I discuss below how the model is identi￿ed despite this limitation. In the robustness section, I also
show that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when the Times is excluded from the analysis
completely, suggesting that limited identi￿cation on the print side does not bias the estimates of the
Post-post.com relationship. The reader should bear in mind, however, that the lack of such excluded
18These correlations drop consumers for whom either print or online papers were excluded from the choice set as
discussed in the demand speci￿cation below.
17variables means that the print-print substitution patterns should be interpreted with more caution
than the print-online substitution patterns.
One way to see the e⁄ect of these excluded variables and perform some checks on their validity
is to use them to instrument for online reading in a linear probability model of print reading. There
are several problems with such a speci￿cation￿ it does not restrict probabilities to be between zero
and one, it restricts the cross-derivative between print and online to be the same for all consumers,
and it does not use information from the other choice equations. However, it shows in an intuitive
way how the exclusion restrictions contribute to identi￿cation.
The ￿rst column of table 4 shows estimates from a linear probability model of readership over the
￿ve-day window, using the same controls as in the partial correlations above. Re￿ ecting the positive
correlation noted earlier, the ￿rst column shows that reading the post.com is positive and signi￿cant
in an OLS regression. The second column presents two-stage least squares estimates using the
excluded variables as instruments. The coe¢ cient on online reading becomes signi￿cantly negative.
The magnitude suggests that if we could do an experiment and randomly assign individuals to
read the online paper (at zero time cost), they would be on average 40 percent less likely to
read the print paper, though the limitations of the linear probability model mean this magnitude
must be interpreted with caution. The F statistic on the instruments in the ￿rst stage is 33.05,
suggesting that weak instruments are not a problem (Stock and Yogo 2002). The ￿2 statistic for
the overidenti￿cation test in this regression is 3.65, with a p value of .302, meaning the validity of
the instruments cannot be rejected.
A possible concern is that even if the excluded variables do not a⁄ect the utility of reading
print newspapers directly, they might be correlated with unmeasured components of print utility.
Consumers who have a taste for reading news might also have tastes or skills that push them toward
the kind of jobs that provide Internet access.19 An individual who dislikes reading, for example,
might be less likely to be successful in white-collar occupations that involve computer-intensive
work. Similarly, individuals with a strong taste for news may be more likely to invest in high speed
Internet connections at home. Although it is by de￿nition impossible to test for the presence of such
unmeasured correlation, some evidence can be obtained by asking how the 2SLS estimates change
when more detailed occupation and industry controls are added. If omitted job characteristics
correlated with both Internet availability and taste for reading news were a source of bias, and if
these were at least partially captured by occupation and industry controls, we would expect these
19A di⁄erent possibility is that the ability to read Internet news per se is an important determinant of job choice.
Because time spent reading online news is a small fraction of the overall time spent at work for most employees, it is
unlikely that this is a ￿rst-order consideration. One way to verify this is to note that if this channel were important,
it would play the biggest role for employees who have recently changed jobs, since Internet access could not have
played a role in job choice prior to the mid-1990￿ s. I cannot observe job tenure directly, but I can use as a rough
proxy the time respondents have lived in their current area of residence. Limiting the sample to those who have lived
in the same area for more than 10 years does not signi￿cantly change the IV point estimates.
18controls to change the IV estimate. The second IV speci￿cation in table 4 shows how the 2SLS
estimate changes when these controls are added. The estimated e⁄ect of online news grows slightly
stronger, but the basic picture remains the same. This is not proof of the validity of the identifying
assumption, but it does provide some con￿dence that the role of unmeasured correlation is limited
(Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005). There is no analogous way to verify the validity of high-speed
Internet access as an excluded variable. However, I show in the robustness section at the end of the
paper that the results are qualitatively unchanged if this exclusion restriction is not imposed. This
suggests that any omitted variables correlated with high-speed access are not signi￿cantly biasing
the results.
A ￿nal concern is that the instruments might drive not only post.com readership but readership
of other online news sources as well. If these are substitutes for print readership, the IV coe¢ cients
could overstate the e⁄ect of the post.com. More generally, in order for the exclusion restrictions
to be valid, the instruments must not shift the utility of reading print newspapers, either directly
or indirectly through goods that have strong interactions with the print paper and are included in
the outside option. The Scarborough survey asks directly whether consumers use the Internet for
news apart from reading online newspapers. As shown in the third IV speci￿cation, adding this
dummy variable as a control actually increases the magnitude of the post.com coe¢ cient slightly
relative to the baseline IV speci￿cation in column two, suggesting that the e⁄ect does indeed work
through the post.com. Of course it may be that the instruments a⁄ect the intensity of other online
news readership in a way not picked up by the dummy variable, in which case we would have to
treat the magnitude of the coe¢ cient as an upper bound.20
4 Empirical speci￿cation
4.1 Demand
To specify the demand model for estimation, index days by t, consumers by i = f1;:::;Ng, goods




bundles are ordered so that r = 0 refers to the empty bundle and r 2 [1;J] refers to the singleton
bundle consisting only of good j = r. De￿ne the base utility to consumer i of consuming a single
good j on day t to be:
￿ uijt = ￿￿pj + ￿j + xi￿j + ￿ij + ￿it.
20In results not reported, I have also veri￿ed that the IV coe¢ cient does not change greatly if I add controls for
consumption of the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and USA Today. As discussed in the outside option
section above, the elasticity conditional on consumption of related goods is di⁄erent from the overall elasticity, and
so it would not have been surprising if this coe¢ cient did change. The fact that it does not, however, suggests
that indirect substitution e⁄ects working through other print papers are small, giving us additional con￿dence that
omission of related products from the complete demand model is unlikely to bias the results.
19Here, pj is the price of good j, ￿j is a constant term, xi is a vector of observable consumer
characteristics, ￿j is a vector of good-speci￿c coe¢ cients, and ￿ij and ￿it are unobservables￿ the
former a good-speci￿c shock that is constant across time, and the latter a day-speci￿c shock that
a⁄ects the utility of all goods equally.
I make several parametric assumptions on the form of the errors. The ￿rst error component,
￿ij, is meant to capture time-constant consumer characteristics including overall taste for news
(which would show up as positive correlation across the ￿ij), brand loyalty to a particular paper,
and current subscription status. I assume ￿ij has a J-dimensional multivariate normal distribution
with a free covariance matrix.21 The second component, ￿it, captures day-to-day variation in the
utility of all papers. This could be caused by shocks to the overall quality of news￿ for example,
days when there is a major event such as September 11, 2001￿ as well as variation in individuals￿
cost of time. To represent these factors as simply as possible, I assume that ￿it has a two-point
discrete distribution￿ it is equal to zero with some probability (1 ￿ ￿) and equal to a value ^ ￿ > 0
with probability ￿.
Because the price coe¢ cient will not be separately identi￿ed in the demand estimation, I will
replace the ￿rst two terms in ￿ uijt by a single constant term:
￿ ￿j = ￿￿pj + ￿j
Later, I will use information from the supply side of the model to separately identify ￿ and ￿j.
To write the utility of a bundle r, de￿ne ￿r to be an interaction term analogous to ￿ in equation
1. That is, ￿r is the di⁄erence between the base utility of bundle r and the sum of the ￿ uijt for
all goods that comprise bundle r. As a matter of convention, I assume that ￿r = 0 for singleton
bundles r 2 [1;J]. Abusing notation to let j 2 r denote the set of goods j included in bundle r, I
de￿ne the utility of consumer i from consuming r on day t to be:




￿ uijt + ￿r + ￿irt if r > 0
where ￿irt is a time-varying shock for each bundle, that will rationalize all remaining day-to-day
variation in choices. I assume that the ￿irt are i.i.d. type-I extreme value.22
Note two important restrictions in this speci￿cation. First, I assume that the interaction terms
21The variance of the errors will be pinned down by the distribution of the logit errors introduced below, so it is
not necessary to impose a normalization on the covariance matrix of the ￿ij.
22It is well known that the assumption of extreme value errors is restrictive and can potentially introduce bias
in welfare estimates. I show below, however, that the ￿irt account for a small portion of the estimated variance in
utility. As argued by Petrin (2002), this provides evidence that the extreme value assumption is not biasing the
results substantially.
20￿r do not vary across consumers. I have experimented with speci￿cations that allow ￿r to vary
with observable characteristics, and have found that they do not change the results substantially.
Second, because the data lacks su¢ cient price variation to estimate price coe¢ cients that are
heterogeneous across consumers, I assume that the price coe¢ cient ￿ is also the same for all i.
The choice set includes three goods: the Washington Post print edition, the post.com, and the
Washington Times. The vector x includes age, sex, education, industry of employment, employment
status, political party, location within the DMA, number of variables on the questionnaire coded as
missing, and time dummies coded in six-month intervals which should pick up changes in quality of
either the included products or their substitutes.23 It also includes log income. Although the direct
e⁄ect of income working through the budget constraint is di⁄erenced out in the discrete choice
model, there may be important unobservables correlated with income such as parental education
or cognitive skills which will be proxied by this variable. Dummy variables for web access at work,
use of the web for education-related tasks, use of the web for work-related tasks, and broadband
connection are allowed to enter utility of the post.com but are excluded from the utility of the two
print editions.
Two additional variables de￿ne whether or not either print or online newspapers were part of a
consumer￿ s choice set. For print newspapers, I use data from the question ￿What newspaper sections
do you generally look at?￿For the approximately 10 percent of consumers who answered that they
did not read any newspaper sections, I assume that print newspapers do not enter their choice set.24
Similarly, I assume that if a consumer does not report using the Internet at all during the last thirty
days, online newspapers are not part of his choice set. I include these variables because I want to
condition on any characteristics that a⁄ect demand for newspapers and are unlikely to change over
the one-week horizon of the data. To allow for the possibility that unobserved characteristics might
be correlated with the choice set measures, I include dummies for each as a control in the utility of
the goods it does not a⁄ect directly (i.e. the ￿no print￿variable enters utility of the online paper
and the ￿no online￿variable enters utility of both print papers).25
The model will generate probabilities of each possible choice on a given day. To write this
formally, denote the vector of all model parameters by ￿. Integrating over the ￿irt yields closed-
23The education dummies are completed high-school, completed college, and completed a post-graduate degree.
Occupation dummies are for white-collar workers and computer workers. Employment status is a dummy for being
employed full-time. Political party includes dummies for being a registered Republican or Democrat. Dummies for
survey periods are each six month interval between March, 2000 and February, 2003. Dummies for location are based
on six county-groups comprising the District of Columbia proper, the metro area, and non-metro surrounding areas.
The number of missing observations ranges from 0 to 7 out of approximately 65 questions.
24Of consumers who reported reading no newspaper sections, 95 percent also reported reading no print newspapers
in the last week. The small number who reported reading no sections but did report reading some paper are dropped
from the sample.
25Otherwise, substitution patterns would also be identi￿ed by variation in the choice set. While this form of
identi￿cation is valid in many settings, it would be hard to argue here that the choice set variation is exogenous and
uncorrelated with other unobserved tastes. It therefore seems safer to include the choice set dummies as controls.


















I sum over these probabilities to match the form of the data: a dummy variable for whether each
product was consumed in the last twenty-four hours and a separate dummy for whether or not it
was consumed in the last ￿ve weekdays. Let ~ q 2
￿
0;1;:::;2J￿5 be a vector indicating the actual
bundle chosen on each of the ￿ve weekdays covered in the survey. Let q index the possible values
of the data we observe￿ a consumer￿ s reported consumption over the twenty-four-hour and ￿ve-
day windows￿ and let ￿(q) be the (possibly empty) set of ~ q that are consistent with reported






[￿Q~ qt(xi;￿i;^ ￿;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)Q~ qt(xi;￿i;0;￿)]:
The discussion of the simple two-good model above provided some intuition for the way exclusion
restrictions and observations of repeated choices by the same consumer identify the parameters of
the demand model. To apply this intuition to the empirical model, note ￿rst that the combination
of twenty-four-hour and ￿ve-day data will pin down the covariance matrix of the ￿i random e⁄ects.
As discussed above, the key point is that the choices in the days before the last twenty-four hours
will be more correlated with the choice in the last twenty-four hours (conditional on observables)
the larger variance of the random e⁄ects. For example, knowing an individual read no papers in
the last twenty-four hours would predict she was also less likely to have read in the previous four
days only if the ￿i were an important component of utility. Moreover, a positive correlation of
the Post and post.com random e⁄ects would predict that an individual who read only the Post in
the last twenty-four hours should be relatively more likely to have read the post.com in the last
￿ve days. We can then think of the information from the exclusion restrictions as identifying the
two parameters of the distribution of the time-varying unobservable, ￿it. If the fact that many
consumers read both print and online on the same day is driven mainly by ￿it, having Internet
access at work should not change the probability of reading in print. If this fact is driven by
complementarity, those with access at work should be more likely to read.
While this discussion suggests that the model will be formally identi￿ed, it is important to
emphasize several limitations. First, the identi￿cation of the random e⁄ects from twenty-four-
hour and ￿ve-day data will be weaker than it would be with a true panel. Second, the variables
on which we can impose exclusion restrictions only shift the utility of the online paper, which
22suggests in particular that identi￿cation of the substitutability between the two print papers will
be weaker than the identi￿cation of print-online substitutability. Finally, the data does not include
price variation that can be used in the demand estimation. For all of these reasons, the imposed
functional forms will play a larger role in driving the results than they would in other applications
with richer data, and this should be borne in mind in interpreting the ￿ndings.
4.2 Supply
As already discussed, limited variation in the prices of the Post and the Times, and the zero price
of the post.com, make it infeasible to estimate the price coe¢ cient ￿ directly. I will instead use
industry information to approximate advertising revenue and cost parameters, and then use the
￿rm-side pricing equation for the Washington Post print edition to back out ￿.
One complication is how to treat the fact that the Post is sold both as single copies and by
subscription. I will abstract from the dynamic choice problem this implies for consumers, and
assume each pays a single price per copy (as noted above, the e⁄ect of subscriptions on the choice
to read or not will be captured by the ￿r unobservables). The cover price of the Post increased
from $.25 at the beginning of the sample period (late 2000) to $.35 at the end of the period (early
2003). The subscription price increased from $11.16 to $12.60 for 4 weeks of daily home delivery.
Pricing out Sunday editions at their cover price of $1.50, the implied price per daily copy ranged
from $.22 to $.25. I will use the average cover price of $.30 in the estimation. In the ￿nal section,
I show that the results are robust to varying the assumed price between $.25 and $.35.26
Another distinction that has not arisen yet, but will be important here, is the di⁄erence between
the readership of the paper and the number of copies sold. Comparing the micro data used in this
study (which measures readership) to circulation ￿gures from the Audit Bureau of Circulations
suggests that the average issue of the Post is read by 2.4 adults.27 This may be accurate, considering
the large fraction of papers that are delivered to multi-occupant households. Alternatively, it may
re￿ ect some over-reporting in the survey data. It turns out that under plausible assumptions, both
scenarios would have the same implications for the model.28 For simplicity, I will therefore describe
26Because there is nothing in the data that would allow me to separate these price changes from demand shocks
that occurred over the same period, I include time dummies in the model and so do not use this price variation to
identify substitution patterns. In the results section below, however, I show that the reactions to these price changes
that the model would predict match the actual changes in the time series quite closely.
27For comparison, the same calculation for the Times suggests that the average issue in 2000 was read by 2.3 adults.
28In either case, we would assume that the revenue derived from a single reported reader is price minus marginal
cost divided by the number of readers per copy, which I denote ￿. If the di⁄erence between circulation and readership
is caused by multiple people reading the same copy, a natural assumption would be that the cost of the issue is shared
equally among all readers, meaning the the consumer pays pj=￿ rather than pj. This will mean the estimated ￿ is
scaled up by ￿, and thus the ￿nal utility estimate is scaled down by the same factor. If the data re￿ ect over-reporting,
we would assume that each reader pays pj, but we would want to divide the ￿nal welfare estimate by ￿ to take account
of the in￿ ated readership numbers. The ￿nal answer would thus be the same in either case.
23the setup of the model assuming there is no over-reporting.29
Building on these assumptions, I suppose that ￿rm costs are made up of a ￿xed ￿rst-copy cost
for both the print and web editions. I assume that the marginal cost of an additional web reader
is zero in a reasonable neighborhood of the observed number of readers, and the marginal cost of
either print edition is constant. Finally, I will use a highly simpli￿ed model for advertising demand,
namely a constant revenue-per-reader for both print and online. Putting these together, I can







Np + awNw ￿ ￿ (5)
where p is the print edition￿ s price; ap and aw are advertising revenue per reported reader for print
and online respectively; Np and Nw are the number of print and online readers;30 cp is the marginal
printing and distribution cost per copy; ￿ is the number of readers per copy; and ￿ is a ￿xed
cost. Based on the assumption that ￿ represents multiple readership, I assume that the price which
enters utility in equation 4 is pj=￿. In the results section, I will plug in demand estimates from the
model and approximations of the marginal advertising revenue and marginal cost terms taken from
industry data. The ￿rst order condition for maximization of ￿ with respect to the print price will
then uniquely de￿ne the price coe¢ cient ￿.
4.3 Estimation
Given the N ￿ K matrix of xi (X) and the N-dimensional vector of observed choices of each









where F(￿;￿) is the multivariate normal distribution of ￿ conditional on parameters ￿. As usual
with a random-coe¢ cients model, however, the integral in equation 6 does not have a closed-form
solution. I will therefore use simulation draws on the distribution of ￿ to form consistent estimates of
these probabilities. The simplest way to do this would be to average the conditional probabilities,
Pqi(xi;￿;￿), over S draws ￿is from the multivariate normal distribution of ￿ for each consumer
i. In the actual estimation, I use an importance-sampling variant of this simulator to generate
29An additional issue related to the fact that consumers do not pay for all the copies that they read could arise if
having access to the Post without charge was correlated with free access to the Times. This would arise if businesses
that provided free copies of one also provided free copies of the other. This would be another source of positive
correlation between the ￿i unobservable of the Post and of the Times. Correlated access to free copies should therefore
not bias the results.
30Note that Nw may include readers both inside and outside of Washington DC. I will use the Post￿ s own estimate
of the fraction of readership outside of DC (about 25 percent) to scale up the survey-based estimate of DC readership
to total readership.
24approximations of the true integral. The simulator re-weights the normal distribution to increase
the likelihood of drawing ￿is for which the observed choices are relatively likely.31
An extensive literature considers techniques for constructing simulation estimators in discrete
choice models. The two leading approaches are the simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estima-
tor ￿rst discussed by Lerman and Manski (1981) and the method of simulated moments (MSM)
proposed by Pakes and Pollard (1989) and McFadden (1989). The main advantage of the latter
is that it is consistent for a ￿xed number of simulation draws as N goes to in￿nity, while the
former also requires the number of simulation draws, S, to approach in￿nity with
p
S=N = O(1).
On the other hand, e¢ ciency of MSM requires the optimal instruments to be calculated exactly,
and its performance can be quite poor when the preliminary parameter estimate used to generate
the instruments is inaccurate (see Gourieroux and Monfort 1996, 43-44, for a discussion). Also,
because the MSM estimator requires calculation of the probabilities and derivatives of all possible
observed choices, it is computationally costly in cases where the choice set is large￿ a situation
especially likely to arise with panel data. In preliminary tests, I estimated both models and found
the parameters did not di⁄er dramatically. Since computation of MSM took ten to twenty times

















The ￿nal estimates are based on 300 simulation draws and adjust equation 9 slightly to incorporate
the ￿rst-order bias correction suggested by Gourieroux and Monfort (1996, 45).32 I calculate
standard errors using the robust asymptotic approximation proposed by McFadden and Train
31To take importance-sampling draws for a particular consumer i, I use a preliminary estimate of the pa-
rameters, ￿0, to generate a simulated approximation of the probability of i￿ s observed choice qi: ^ Pqi(xi;￿0) = R
￿ Pqi(xi;￿;￿0)dF(￿;￿0). Since this is calculated only once for each i, it can be approximated with a large number












where Wqi(xi;￿s;￿0) = ^ Pqi (xi;￿0)=Pqi(xi;￿s;￿0). Drawing from h() is simple since it is just the distribution of ￿
conditional on choice qi, and draws can thus be taken using an acceptance-rejection method.
32The bias correction can be derived as follows. Let ~ f be the simulated value of a choice probability and let f be
the true value. Bias in SML arises because even though E( ~ f) = f, it is not true that E(ln ~ f) = lnf. A second order
expansion of ln ~ f around f shows




( ~ f ￿ f)
2
f2 :
This suggests replacing the log term in Equation 9 (i.e. ln ~ f) with a consistent estimator of ln ~ f +(1=2)E ( ~ f ￿f)
2=f
2.
25(2000). Standard errors for welfare estimates and other statistics computed from the model in
later stages are estimated by taking 100 draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated
parameters ^ ￿
SML
, computing the statistic in question at each draw, and calculating the sample
standard deviation (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1999; Nevo 2001).33
5 Results
5.1 Demand parameters
Table 5 displays SML estimates of the coe¢ cients on observable characteristics. Most of the coef-
￿cients in the utility of the Post and post.com are signi￿cant, as are about half the coe¢ cients in
the utility of the Times. On the whole, the results correspond closely to expectations.
The coe¢ cients in the utility of the Post are consistent with its reputation as a relatively
high-brow, liberal newspaper. Education and income both have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect.
Considering a consumer with characteristics at the mean of the data, college attendance, graduate
school attendance, and doubling household income increase the probability of choosing the Post by
31, 34, and 9 percentage points respectively. Being a registered Democrat increases the probability
by 3 points on the margin, while being a registered Republican reduces the probability by 2 points.
Age has a positive impact, with an additional ten years of age adding 8 points to the probability.
Being employed full-time decreases the probability of choosing the Post by 14 points, having a
white-collar job not related to computers decreases it by 5 points, and having a computer-related
job decreases it by 7 points.
The coe¢ cients of post.com utility are generally of the same sign as the Post coe¢ cients,
though their magnitudes in terms of marginal e⁄ects are smaller (re￿ ecting the lower predicted
probability of choosing the post.com overall￿ 16 percent versus 53 percent for the Post). Two
notable exceptions are age and employment: adding ten years of age decreases the probability of
a mean consumer choosing the post.com by 1 percentage point; being employed full-time increases
the probability by 2 points, having a white-collar job increases it by 1 point, and having a computer-
related job increases it by 3 points. The age coe¢ cient is consistent with a widely cited belief in
the industry that the online edition has the potential to reach out to younger consumers. The


































33As discussed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999), this method will generally be superior to the alternative
of linearizing the estimates in the parameters and then computing standard errors analytically (the delta method).
Another alternative would be to estimate all standard errors in the model by bootstrapping. This would add greatly
to the computational cost since it would require estimating all parameters of the model for each sub-sample of the
original data.
26employment coe¢ cients re￿ ect the fact that the online edition is frequently read at work.
The coe¢ cients in the utility of the Times are consistent with its reputation for being more
conservative than the Post. Registered Republicans are signi￿cantly more likely to choose the
Times, with a marginal e⁄ect of 3 percentage points, which is large viewed relative to the average
predicted probability of choosing the Times, which is 9 percent.
Table 6 shows estimates of the other parameters in the model. The ￿rst section shows the values
of the interaction terms (￿). Both of the print-online interaction terms are signi￿cantly negative.
The Post-Times term is positive but small and not signi￿cant. This implies that the post.com is a
substitute for both print papers, consistent with the IV reduced-form regressions; the substitution
patterns are discussed in more detail below. The second section shows that the ￿ and ￿ parameters
are equal to 6.8 and .045 respectively. This means that on 4.5 percent of days the utility of all three
products increases by about 7 units￿ a natural interpretation is that major news stories which
occur relatively rarely increase demand for news overall. The third section shows coe¢ cients on
the variables that were excluded a priori from utility of the print editions, all of which have the
predicted signs, and half of which are signi￿cant.
Table 7 shows the sample covariance of the estimated utility from observables, the estimated
covariance matrix of the unobservables ￿, and the variance of the ￿ and ￿ unobservables. The
correlation of utilities for the Post and post.com, and for the post.com and the Times, are more
positive than the observables alone would predict. The variance of the unobservable component
of Times utility is quite large, re￿ ecting the fact that Times consumption is more consistent over
days than the small probabilities from the model without unobservables would allow. Finally,
comparing the relative magnitudes of the di⁄erent utility components shows: (i) the variance of
the ￿i is substantial relative to the observables; (ii) the ￿i unobservables contribute relatively little
to the variance (although the di⁄erence in utility on the occasional ￿major news days￿when ￿i is
positive is substantial); and (iii) the role of the ￿i is quite small, meaning the usual concerns about
incorporating logit errors in estimating the value of new goods are not likely to be a major issue.
One interesting point to note is that the unobserved correlation between the Post and Times is
negative. One possibility is that the print papers are preferred for particular kinds of content￿ say
political coverage￿ on which tastes in the population are particularly divided.34 It is also possible
that the lack of excluded variables that enter the Post and the Times separately means that the
covariance of their unobservables is underestimated.
The overall ￿t of the model can be measured in a number of ways. One is to look at the ￿t of
34Suppose that there are two types of content: breaking news and political analysis. Breaking news coverage is
only available online but consumers prefer reading political analysis in print. Then if unmeasured political tastes
are strong (as they surely are in Washington) we might expect to see liberal news junkies reading the Post and the
post.com and conservative news junkies reading the Times and the post.com but few consumers reading the Post and
the Times.
27the aggregate predictions. A simulation of choices from the model matches the aggregate shares
closely: the overall MSE is :0016. We can also look on a more micro level at how well the model is
able to ￿t consumer heterogeneity. One way to see this is to compare the predicted probabilities of
a particular choice for consumers who actually consumed that choice to the predicted probabilities
for those who did not. The predicted probability of those who made a particular choice is on
average 2:1 times as great as the probability for those who did not make that choice.
5.2 Supply parameters and price coe¢ cient
To calculate the marginal advertising revenue ap and aw, I assume that the quantity of advertising
space both in print and online is ￿xed (at least over small variations in readership), and the print
and online advertising markets are competitive with a ￿xed price per-reader per-day. Note that
this abstracts from many important features of the advertising market, including di⁄erential values
for di⁄erent types of consumers, the extent to which the same reader on two consecutive days is
valued di⁄erently from two di⁄erent readers, and possible market power of the Post.
I will estimate the advertising parameters by averaging over observed revenue and readership
of the Post for 2001 and 2002. For 2001 and 2002, the Post had total print advertising revenue
of $574.3 million and $555.7 million respectively (Washington Post Company 2002). Apportioning
this by the percentage of circulation accounted for by the daily edition gives $1.5 and $1.4 million
per day. For daily circulation of 771,614 in 2001 and 768,600 in 2002, we have an average value of
ap = $1:91.
Online advertising revenue is not made public, but I employ two sources of information to get
a ballpark ￿gure. First, total revenue for the Post￿ s online division was $30.4 million and $35.9
million for 2001 and 2002 respectively (Washington Post Company 2002), of which the majority
was revenue for the post.com. The average daily online readership of the post.com within the
Washington DC DMA (estimated from the Scarborough data) is 450,457; Post ￿nancials state that
roughly 75 percent of the post.com￿ s total readership is within the DMA. Dividing 75 percent of
the average online division revenue by the DC readership gives a per-reader advertising revenue
of aw = $:15. Second, Competitive Media Research tracks online advertising spending for major
websites. While they do not track the post.com, they provided me with an estimate of June 2001
advertising revenue for the New York Times online edition. If we assume that this month was
representative, nytimes.com revenue for 2001 was $32.4 million, which, combined with nytimes.com
readership statistics from Media Metrix, yields ￿w = $:16.35 I will use the $:16 ￿gure in estimation,
35Competitive Media Research reports that June 2001 advertising revenue for the nytimes.com was $2,701,085.
Media Metrix reports the number of unique readers of the nytimes.com in July 2001 at 5,034,000. Assuming that
the ratio of monthly to daily readership at the nytimes.com was the same as at the post.com, this implies a daily
nytimes.com readership of 562,883.
28and then check the robustness of the results to apportioning a smaller fraction of post.com revenue
to online advertising.
The next parameter is the marginal cost of printing and distribution for an additional print
copy. According to industry sources, the largest component of marginal cost is newsprint. The
Post￿ s average annual newsprint consumption in 2001-2002 was 226,796 metric tons (Editor and
Publisher 2001), and the average price was $541 per metric ton (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005).
Using these ￿gures along with the Post￿ s circulation and average number of pages per issue, I
estimate that the newsprint cost was 37 cents per daily copy. Considering that there are additional
marginal costs of ink and distribution, I will estimate cp = $:40 and check robustness to values
ranging from $.30 to $.50.
The ￿nal parameter is the Post￿ s price. As discussed above, I will abstract from the details of
subscription and single-copy pricing and assume that each reader faces the same per-copy price. I
use the average cover price of $.30 in the estimation. Below, I show that the results are robust to
varying the assumed price between $.25 and $.35.
With these estimates, we can now solve for the price coe¢ cient. Note that the additional pro￿t





while the additional pro￿t from each online reader is just aw = $:16. It will be convenient to write
the expected number of Post print and online readers as a function of ￿ ￿ (the vector of all ￿ ￿j) and









it is straightforward to calculate both these quantities and their derivatives with respect to ￿ ￿ for
a particular vector of estimated parameters ^ ￿.36 Observing that @￿ ￿j=@pj = ￿￿, we can write the





























Given the observed values and model estimates, everything in this equation is known other than





















where r 2 print denotes the set of all bundles that include the print paper. The number of online readers is de￿ned
analogously. To estimate these quantities, I replace the integral over ￿i with a simulation estimator identical to the
one described in the section on welfare estimates below. To estimate the derivatives I replace the Qir() terms with
their derivatives, which have a closed form.
29￿. So long as the term in brackets is non-zero (which will occur at the estimated values with
probability one) there is a unique value of ￿ such that the price derivative is zero at the observed
value of ppost. That is, there is a unique value of ￿ such that the current value of ppost maximizes
Post pro￿ts. Following this procedure yields a point estimate of ￿ equal to 9.72.37
5.3 Substitution patterns
One of the main questions that motivated this paper was whether the introduction of the post.com
has had a signi￿cant crowding out e⁄ect on demand for the Post. The reduced-form results provided
some evidence: in a simple OLS linear probability model, all pairs of goods appeared to be strong
complements; in the IV speci￿cation, the sign of the Post-post.com interaction switched, suggesting
substitutability. We can now see how these conclusions hold up in the full model.
The key ￿ndings are summarized in table 8. The table shows three indicators of the degree
of complementarity or substitutability between the print and online editions of the Post: (i) the
cross-price derivative of demand, calculated as the change in readership of the post.com per $.10
change in the price of the Post; (ii) the change in Post readership when the post.com is added
to the choice set; and (iii) and the cost of this lost readership in terms of pro￿ts from the print
edition. The ￿rst panel shows the results for the full model, the second panel shows the results for
a model with observable consumer characteristics only, and the ￿nal panel shows the results when
the model is estimated allowing for neither observable nor unobservable heterogeneity.
The table suggests two key conclusions. The ￿rst is that the print and online papers are signif-
icant substitutes. I estimate that a $.10 (33 percent) increase in the price of the Post would lead
to an increase in post.com readership of 8,358 (2 percent). Comparing actual Post demand with
the counterfactual simulation in which the post.com is removed from the choice set, I ￿nd that
introducing the post.com reduces Post readership by about 27,000 readers per day and reduces
Post pro￿ts by approximately $5.5 million per year. These e⁄ects are all precisely estimated and
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Their magnitude is moderate, however, and certainly does not
suggest anything close to a one-for-one crowding out of print readership. The second conclusion is
that properly accounting for observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity is critical to obtain-
ing accurate results. A model that includes consumer observables but no correlated unobservables
(i.e. the ￿i and ￿it are ￿xed at zero) would lead us to conclude that the products are complements
rather than substitutes: the cross-price derivative has the same magnitude but the opposite sign
of the true estimate, and introducing the post.com is estimated to have increased pro￿ts from the
37Note that the assumption here is that ppost is chosen optimally conditional on the characteristics of it and all
other products in the market. This includes the current zero price of the post.com. The assumption that this price is
chosen optimally seems justi￿ed by the fact that the subscription price at least has changed frequently over the survey
period. Furthermore, I show below that the results do not change substantially if we assume that the ￿true￿price is
$.25 or $.35 rather than $.30, suggesting that the estimates will also be robust to small deviations from optimization.
30print edition by $5 million per year. A model with neither observed nor unobserved heterogeneity
suggests even stronger complementarity, with the post.com increasing print pro￿ts by $11 million
per year.38
The relationship of both the Post and the post.com to the Times is weaker than their relationship
to each other. The post.com and Times are signi￿cant substitutes, and the estimated elasticity
implies that a $.10 increase in the price of the Times would increase post.com readership by 2,781.
The cross-price derivative of the Post and the Times is negative, close to zero, and insigni￿cant.
This implies that the products are essentially independent.
5.4 Consumer surplus
From the estimated demand parameters, it is a straightforward exercise to calculate the welfare
e⁄ects of an individual product. For clarity in what follows, I denote the portion of utility excluding
the ￿irt by ^ uir(￿;￿). Let the space of possible bundles be R and let R￿j ￿ R be the set of bundles
that do not include good j. We can then calculate consumer i￿ s expected gain from adding good j












r2R￿j ^ uir(￿;￿) + ￿irt
￿
; (10)
Note that this is the expected value from the perspective of the econometrician, given all observed
data. Since ￿ is constant for a given consumer over time, the choice observed in the data will
contain information about the expected value of ￿, and the expectation should therefore integrate
over ￿ conditional on i￿ s choice. The shocks ￿ and ￿, on the other hand, are i.i.d. across consumers
and periods, and observed choices contain no information about its expected value in the future.
Thus, the integral over ￿ and ￿ should be unconditional. A standard result on the expectation of















38One way to cross-check the validity of the estimated elasticities is to compare the estimated own-price elasticity
to an aggregate time series of the Post￿ s price and readership over a longer period. I have calculated a price series for
1994-2003 using a weighted average of the Post￿ s single-copy and subscription prices. I then calculated counterfactual
readership, beginning in 1994 and assuming no change in demand other than reaction to price changes at the estimated
own-price elasticity of .37. The ￿t of the counterfactual to actual circulation is good, suggesting that Post demand is
indeed relatively inelastic, and the technique of backing out the price coe¢ cient from the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order condition
yields reasonable results.





















where ri is i￿ s observed choice, ^ ￿ is the ￿tted value of ￿, and each ￿s is an independent draw from
the estimated (unconditional) distribution of unobservables. The conditional probability of ￿s given





Here, ￿ Qir(p) is a consistent estimator of the unconditional expectation of Qir(p;￿) over ￿ which
can easily be generated by simulation. The ￿gures in utils can be converted to dollars by dividing









A number of caveats should be emphasized about the validity of these ￿gures. First, we don￿ t
actually see prices varying over a large range so the estimates depend heavily on the assumption
of quasilinearity that allows utils to be converted into dollars at a constant rate. It is variation
in consumer characteristics that allows us to map out the demand curve against the scale given
by the normalized ￿it distribution. Alternative error distributions, or speci￿cations that allowed
the variance of ￿it to di⁄er across bundles, could yield di⁄erent results. Second, the analysis here
ignores the welfare of consumers who may read the post.com outside of the Washington DC area.
Finally, the model does not take account of changes in the prices or characteristics of other products
in response the post.com￿ s introduction. If the added competition from the post.com caused the
quality of competing papers to be improved, for example, we would understate the consumer welfare
gains.
The results of the consumer surplus calculation are presented in Table 9. We can get some idea
of the welfare e⁄ects of the post.com independent of the estimated price coe¢ cient by looking at
the surplus of post.com readers relative to the surplus of print readers. I ￿nd that the average
post.com reader￿ s surplus is 70 percent of the average print reader￿ s surplus. Aggregating over
readers, this means that the total consumer welfare gain from the post.com is 16 percent of the
total print surplus. In dollars, I ￿nd that the average post.com reader would be willing to pay $.30
per day. The total consumer surplus gain from the post.com is $123,413 per day, or $45 million per
year.
325.5 Producer surplus and online pricing
The calculation of producer surplus is also straightforward. Given estimates for the advertising and
marginal cost parameters, the gain to a given company from the addition of a particular product
can be calculated by simulating the change in demand when that product is removed from the
choice set, and calculating the resulting change in pro￿t from equation 5.
Similar caveats to the above will apply here. Once again, the results will be sensitive to the
stylized supply-side model, and especially the values used for advertising revenue. Furthermore,
the producer surplus calculations only apply to the welfare of the Post and Times companies. This
neglects a number of other ￿rms that are a⁄ected by the post.com. The most notable example is
advertisers. Other examples include other newspaper companies, television and radio companies,
and other online news providers.
In table 10, I present a more detailed breakdown of the counterfactual changes in readership
when the post.com is removed from the choice set. As already mentioned, Post readership would
increase by about 27,000 per day. The bottom rows of this table show the change in the choices
of two speci￿c groups of consumers: those who read both the post.com and the Post and those
who read the post.com alone. Of consumers in the ￿rst group, almost 80 percent would switch to
reading the Post alone, while a smaller number would stop reading entirely.39 Of consumers in the
second group, 27 percent would start reading the Post, while almost 70 percent would switch to
the outside good.
These demand e⁄ects are translated into dollars in table 11. I estimate that the introduction
of the post.com cost about $5.5 million a year in lost print pro￿ts, compared to the $33.2 million
dollars of revenue generated directly. The e⁄ect on the Times is smaller, with the customers who
substitute to the post.com decreasing pro￿ts by about $2.7 million. The total gain in producer
surplus from the online edition (before taking account of post.com operating costs) is thus $25
million.
Based on these results, can we understand the Post Company￿ s decision to introduce the
post.com? The answer, of course, hinges on the operating costs ignored in the previous calcu-
lations. While the Post does not break out costs separately for the online division, the New York
Times does. Reported costs of New York Times Digital were $63.5 million and $67.7 million for
2001 and 2002 respectively (New York Times Company 2003). Given the larger scale of the New
York Times online operations, we could take the cost ￿gure of $60 million as an upper bound on
the costs of the post.com. On the other hand, the Post reported in 2001 that its online division
is losing money, so a reasonable lower bound would be $30 million. Taking the midpoint of these
39To understand why some readers switch to the outside good, recall that the ￿irt unobservables make the interaction
of goods in utility heterogeneous. This means that for some consumers the products are actually complements, even
though they are substitutes in aggregate demand.
33bounds as a ballpark ￿gure, the net annual e⁄ect of the post.com on producer surplus was a loss
of roughly $20 million. This makes the decision seem puzzling.
On the other hand, online revenues almost doubled between 2002 and 2004, driven in large part
by an improved market for online advertising. If use the 2004 revenues (changing only the advertis-
ing price per reader but keeping all other parameters the same), the picture changes substantially.
The total gain to the Post Company from introducing the post.com is now estimated to be about
$56.5 million per year, the e⁄ect net of operating costs (again assumed to be $45 million) is a gain
of $11.5 million per year, and the total change in producer surplus is an increase of $9 million
per year. These calculations suggest that the initial losses of the online paper may have been an
investment in anticipation of future market growth.
A ￿nal question that the structural model allows us to investigate is whether or not the zero
price of the online edition is surprising. As mentioned in the introduction, I take two approaches
to this question. The ￿rst is to allow that the Post Company may be setting the price of the online
edition sub-optimally. Recall that the estimate of the price coe¢ cient was based on the assumption
that the price of the print edition was set optimally, conditional on the online price. No assumption
was made about the optimality of the online price itself. We can therefore ask whether holding
product characteristics and the print price constant, the Post Company could increase its pro￿ts
by charging a positive price for the online edition.40 I vary the online price, recalculating expected
demand for all products, and using this demand to calculate expected pro￿ts.
The results show that the estimated pro￿t-maximizing price is $.20 per day, or about $6 per
month. Note that because the predicted demand and pro￿ts are re-computed from the model for
each price, these estimates take account of the direct revenue gains from the price change, the
o⁄setting reduction in advertising revenue, and the resulting increase in print readership. The loss
from charging a price of zero is approximately $9 million, or more than a quarter of post.com
advertising revenue. The $6 per month estimate is close to the prices of the few online newspapers
that did charge for access during the sample period: in 2003, the online subscription prices for two
such papers, the Wall Street Journal and the Tulsa World, were $6.95 and $3.75 respectively.
A second approach is to assume that the Post Company is choosing both the print and online
prices optimally and use this assumption to estimate a lower bound on the real or perceived trans-
actions cost of online payments. Real costs could arise on the consumer side from the hassle of
entering a credit card number or fear of online fraud. For ￿rms, they would be primarily the cost of
processing credit card transactions. Consumers might have additional perceived costs if an online
newspaper charging positive prices deviates from the prevailing norm and is thus seen as unfair. I
40Note that because I perform this counter-factual holding the print price constant, the pro￿t-maximizing online
price I compute is only optimal in a constrained sense.
34assume that the constant term in the utility of the post.com is:
￿ ￿post:com = ￿post:com ￿ ￿ppost:com ￿ ￿I (ppost:com > 0)
where ￿ is the transactions cost and I() is the indicator function. Since ppost:com = 0 in the observed
data, the demand model provides us with an estimate of ￿post:com. We can then plug in the earlier
computed value of ￿ and look for the lowest value of ￿ such that total pro￿ts are maximized by
setting ppost:com = 0. The results show that ￿ would have to be at least $.13 per day. Whether this
is large or small is a matter of speculation, but it does not seem out of the realm of possibility.
Crucially, the more favorable online advertising market of 2004 greatly reduces the incentives to
raise the online edition￿ s price. The optimal price using 2004 online advertising revenue is estimated
to be only $.09, and the lost pro￿ts from charging a price of zero are just $1.7 million. Furthermore,
a zero price would now be optimal for a transaction cost of $.02 or greater.
5.6 Robustness checks
In table 12, I present results from the model under a number of alternative assumptions. The ￿rst
two experiments use values of ￿ derived from the assumption that the price of the Post was $.25
and $.35 respectively. Recall that since the former was the price through the end of 2001, and
the latter was the price for 2002-2003, the estimates presented earlier were based on the average
of these two ￿ values. The table shows that varying ￿ in this range does not substantially change
any of the estimates. The next two experiments vary the marginal cost per print copy of the Post
between $.30 and $.50 ($.40 was the value used in estimation). The table shows that the changes
in this case are slightly larger￿ the optimal price varies by $.04, and consumer surplus varies by $5
million￿ but none of the qualitative results are a⁄ected.
The following row uses a lower estimate of post.com revenue than the $33 million assumed
earlier. The ￿gure used, $25 million, is a low estimate taking account of the fact that the Post￿ s
online division includes several ventures other than the post.com, including the online edition of
Newsweek magazine. Predictably, this change does have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the estimated surplus
from introducing the post.com, reducing it by about a third. Other e⁄ects are smaller, however: the
estimated optimal price increases by $.04 and estimated consumer surplus is essentially unchanged.
The next row presents results from the model estimated without using data on broadband
access. The di⁄erences with the preferred estimates are small, suggesting that any correlation
between broadband access and unmeasured tastes is not substantially biasing the results.
The ￿nal row presents results for the model estimated using data on only Post and post.com
consumption (thus including the Times as an outside good). The results are again qualitatively the
same, with the estimated Post Company and consumer surpluses increasing slightly. The fact that
35the estimated interaction between the Post and post.com does not change con￿rms the theoretical
argument made earlier that the estimated substitution patterns will not be biased when important
goods are included in the outside alternative. It also con￿rms that even if the data lacks the power
to pin down the Post-Times interaction perfectly, this will not bias the results of primary interest.
Overall, the results seem robust to varying the supply parameters and form of the utility func-
tion, with none of the qualitative results from the model changing under the alternative assumptions
considered.
6 Conclusions
Many important questions in economics turn on the extent to which new goods either crowd out or
complement existing products. Examples of new goods such as radio, movies, PCs, and ￿le sharing
suggest that these relationships can be highly uncertain ex ante. This paper provides new methods
for estimating the true relationships and calculating important quantities such as consumer welfare
and responses to alternative pricing regimes.
The application to online newspapers addresses three questions: Are print and online newspapers
substitutes or complements? How has the introduction of online news a⁄ected the welfare of
consumers and newspaper ￿rms? And how might demand respond if papers were to charge positive
prices for online content that is currently provided free of charge?
I ￿nd, ￿rst, that print and online papers are clearly substitutes. The apparent positive rela-
tionship in the data is an artifact of unmeasured consumer heterogeneity, and disappears in the
full demand model. The magnitude of the crowding out of print readership is non-negligible. It
is also small, however, relative to some earlier predictions. Assuming that substitution patterns
for newspapers in the Washington DC market are broadly representative of substitution patterns
elsewhere, the advent of online newspapers does not appear to threaten the survival of print media.
Second, the welfare bene￿ts of the online newspaper appear to outweigh its costs. Consumers gain
$45 million a year from free provision of the online paper, and although the ￿rm appeared to su⁄er
a net loss during the 2000-2003 period, an improved advertising market means that the current
annual e⁄ect on ￿rm pro￿ts is probably positive. Finally, I ￿nd that in the period under study,
the ￿rm could have increased pro￿ts by charging a positive price for online content. However, the
potential gain is virtually eliminated at current advertising levels, and would disappear with a small
transaction cost of online payments.
36References
[1] Ahrens, Frank. 2001. The Post to raise paper￿ s price to 35 cents a copy. Washington Post.
December 14.
[2] Altonji, Joseph G., Todd E. Elder, and Christopher R. Taber. 2005. Selection on observed
and unobserved variables: Assessing the e⁄ectiveness of Catholic schools. Journal of Political
Economy 113 (1): 151-184.
[3] Angwin, Julia and Joseph T. Hallinan. 2005. Newspaper circulation continues decline, forcing
tough decisions. Wall Street Journal. 2 May.
[4] Augereau, Angelique, Shane Greenstein, and Marc Rysman. 2004. Coordination vs. di⁄erenti-
ation in a standards war: 56K modems. Boston University mimeo.
[5] Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes. 1999. Voluntary export restraints on auto-
mobiles: Evaluating a trade policy. American Economic Review 89(3): 400-430.
[6] Berry, Steven and Joel Waldfogel. 1999. "Public radio in the United States: Does it correct
market failure or cannibalize commercial stations?" Journal of Public Economics 71(2): 189-
211.
[7] Blackburn, David. 2004. Online piracy and recorded music sales. Harvard University mimeo.
[8] Bolonik, Kera. 2001. Page to screen and back. Publishers Weekly. 1 October.
[9] Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Robert J. Gordon, Eds. 1997. The Economics of New Goods.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[10] Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2005. Commodity price index. Series ID WPU09130291. Retrieved
5 March, 2005 from www.bls.gov.
[11] Chan, Tat Y. 2004. Estimating a continuous hedonic choice model with an application to
demand to soft drinks. Washington University mimeo.
[12] Dube, Jean-Pierre. 2004. Multiple discreteness and product di⁄erentiation: Demand for car-
bonated soft drinks. Marketing Science 23(1): 66.
[13] Editor and Publisher. 2001. Editor & Publisher International Yearbook. New York: Editor and
Publisher Co.
[14] Esterl, Mike. 2005. New York Times sets an online fee. Wall Street Journal. 17 May.
[15] Federal Communications Commission. 2001. FCC initiates proceeding to review newspaper-
broadcast cross-ownership rule. Press release: September 13.
[16] Gates, Dominic. 2000. E-book evangelist: Microsoft￿ s brash Dick Brass leads the revolution
that could bury dead trees. Industry Standard. 25 September. Retrieved 8 November, 2002
from http://www.thestandard.net.
[17] ￿ ￿ . 2002. News sites hustle for pro￿tability. USC Annenberg Online Journalism Review, July
11, 2002. Retrieved 8 November, 2002 from http://www.ojr.org.
37[18] Gentzkow, Matthew. 2005. Valuing new goods in a model with complementarity: online news-
papers. University of Chicago mimeo.
[19] Goolsbee, Austan. 2001. Competition in the computer industry: Online versus retail. Journal
of Industrial Economics 49 (4): 487-499.
[20] Goolsbee, Austan and Amil Petrin. 2004. The consumer gains from direct broadcast satellites
and the competition with cable TV. Econometrica 72 (2): 351-81.
[21] Gourieroux, Christian and Alain Monfort. 1996. Simulation-Based Econometric Methods. New
York: Oxford U. Press.
[22] Greenstein, Shane M. 1997. From superminis to supercomputers: Estimating surplus in the
computing market. In Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon Eds. The Economics of
New Goods. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[23] Harris, Robert G. and C. Je⁄rey Kraft. 1997. Meddling through: Regulating local telephone
competition in the United States. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4): 93.
[24] Hausman, Jerry A. 1997. Valuation of new goods under perfect and imperfect competition. In
Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon Eds. The Economics of New Goods. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
[25] Hendel, Igal. 1999. Estimating multiple-discrete choice models: An application to computeri-
zation returns. Review of Economic Studies 66: 423-46.
[26] Henry, David. 2000. Is Bu⁄et too quick to write o⁄ newspapers? USA Today. 4 May.
[27] Keane, Michael P. 1992. A note on identi￿cation in the multinomial probit model. Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics 10 (2): 193-200.
[28] Kim, Jaehwan, Greg M. Allenby, and Peter E. Rossi. 2002. Modeling consumer demand for
variety. Marketing Science 21 (3): 229-50.
[29] Lerman, Steven R. and Charles F. Manski. 1981. On the use of simulated frequencies to
approximate choice probabilities. In Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric
Applications, edited by Charles F. Manski and Daniel McFadden. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[30] Manski, Charles F. and Leonard Sherman. 1980. An empirical analysis of household choice
among motor vehicles. Transportation Research 14A: 349-66.
[31] McFadden, Daniel. 1989. A method of simulated moments for estimation of discrete response
models without numerical integration. Econometrica 57 (5): 995-1026.
[32] McFadden, Daniel and Kenneth Train. 2000. Mixed MNL models for discrete response. Journal
of Applied Economics 15: 447-70.
[33] Mortimer, Julie Holland and Alan Sorensen. 2005. Supply responses to digital distribution:
Recorded music and live performances. Harvard University mimeo.
[34] Nevo, Aviv. 2000. A practitioner￿ s guide to estimation of random-coe¢ cients logit models of
demand. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 9(4): 513-48.
38[35] ￿ ￿ ￿ . 2001. Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Econometrica 69(2):
307-42.
[36] New York Times Company. 2003. The New York Times Company reports fourth-
quarter and full-year results. Press release, 28 January. Retrieved 31 October, 2003 from
http://www.nytco.com/press.html.
[37] Oberholzer, Felix and Koleman Strumpf. 2004. The e⁄ect of ￿le sharing on record sales: An
empirical analysis. Harvard Business School mimeo.
[38] Ogaki, Masao. 1990. The indirect and direct substitution e⁄ects. American Economic Review
80 (5): 1271-75.
[39] Okrent, Dan. 1999. The death of print? Columbia University lecture, 14 December. Retrieved
8 November, 2002 from http://www.digitaljournalist.org.
[40] Pakes, Ariel and David Pollard. 1989. Simulation and the asymptotics of optimization estima-
tors. Econometrica 57 (5): 1027-57.
[41] Petrin, Amil. 2002. Quantifying the bene￿ts of new products: The case of the minivan."
Journal of Political Economy 110(4): 705-29.
[42] Prat, Andrea and David Stromberg. 2005. Commercial television and voter information. Lon-
don School of Economics mimeo.
[43] Rob, Rafael and Joel Waldfogel. 2004. Piracy on the high C￿ s: Music downloading, sales dis-
placement, and social welfare in a sample of college students. University of Pennsylvania mimeo.
[44] Runnett, Rob. 2001. NY Times Digital ￿nds ￿magical mix￿in print/online media relationship.
Newspaper Association of America. Retrieved 26 February, 2002 from http://www.naa.org.
[45] Runett, Rob. 2002. Yes circulation directors, they￿ re still buying the paper: Single-copy pur-
chases up during Belden Q3 survey. The Digital Edge. January.
[46] Samuelson, Paul A. 1974. Complementarity: An essay on the 40th anniversary of the Hicks-
Allen revolution in demand theory. Journal of Economic Literature 12 (4): 1255-89.
[47] Seelye, Katharine Q. 2005. Can papers end the free ride online? New York Times. 14 March.
[48] Selen, Abigail J. and richard H. R. Harper. 2002. The Myth of the Paperless O¢ ce. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
[49] Sinai, Todd and Joel Waldfogel. 2004. Geography and the Internet: is the Internet a substitute
or a complement for cities? Journal of Urban Economics 56: 1-24.
[50] Smith, Howard. 2004. Supermarket choice and supermarket competition in market equilibrium.
Review of Economic Studies 71: 235-63.
[51] Starr, Paul. 2004. The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications.
New York, Basic Books.
[52] Sterling, Christopher H. and John M. Kittross. 2001. Stay Tuned: A History of American
Broadcasting. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
39[53] Stock, James H. and Motohiro Yogo. 2002. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression.
Harvard University mimeo.
[54] Train, Kenneth E., Daniel L. McFadden, and Moshe Ben-Akiva. 1987. The demand for local
telephone service: A fully discrete model of residential calling patterns and service choices.
RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1): 109-23.
[55] Uzanne, Octave. 1894. The end of books. Scribners 16: 221-231.
[56] Washington Post Company. 2002. Annual Report 2002.
[57] Zentner, Alejandro. 2003. Measuring the e⁄ect of music downloads on music purchases. Uni-
versity of Chicago mimeo.
40Figure 1


























Figures show the regions of U A-U B space in which the consumer would choose the 
bundles A&B, B alone, A alone, or neither good. The first panel shows the case where the 
interaction between the two goods in utility is zero, the second panel the case where it is 
positive, and the third panel the case where it is negative.Figure 2




















Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations; Scarborough Research.Readership figures are derived by using 
historical circulation data and the ratio of readership to circulation in the 2000-2003 Scarborough 
data.Table 1
Summary statistics
Scarborough Washington DC DMA
Survey (Census)
N 16,179 4,203,621











< High school 7.7% 14.4%
High school 47.0% 42.1%
College 27.2% 26.3%
Graduate 18.0% 17.2%
The Scarborough survey is a randomized sample of residents of the 
Washington DC DMA eighteen years of age and older. All census 
figures refer to to the population of individuals eighteen years of age 
and older, except percent Black and Hispanic, which are proportions of 
all residents. Median income is the population-weighted mean of the 
median incomes of counties in the Washington DC DMA.Table 2
Cross-tabulation of Post and post.com readership
24-hour: Didn't read post.com Read post.com
Didn't read Post 8,771 622
Read Post 5,829 877
5-day: Didn't read post.com Read post.com
Didn't read Post 6,012 680
Read Post 7,203 2,204
Table 3
Correlation coefficients
Raw Partial Raw Partial
Post-post.com .0989** .0364** .1579** .0673**
Post-Times .0632** .0035 .0450** -.0623**
Times-post.com .0146 .0090 .0184 .0066
24-hour 5-day
** significant at 1%. The table displays correlation coefficients between dummy variables 
for reading the Post, post.com, and Times. In the first two columns, the variable is equal to 
one if a respondent read in the last twenty-four hours. In the second two columns, the 
variable is equal to one if a respondent read in the last five weekdays. Partial correlations are 
correlations in the residuals from regressions of each consumption dummy on controls for 
age, sex, education (four categories), white-collar worker, computer worker, employment 
status, income, political party, date of survey, location of residence within the DMA (six 
categories), and dummy variables for the number of missing values. Observations where 
either print or online newspapers were not in the choice set  (consumer reports that she 
generally reads no newspaper sections or did not use the Internet in the last thirty days) were 
dropped.Table 4
Linear probability model of Post consumption
OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: read Post last 5 days
Read post.com last 5 days .0464** -.4132** -.4579** -.4381**
(.0090) (.107) (.119) (.141)




Overidentification test p value .302 .431 .219
R-squared .333 .214 .207 .202
N 14313 14313 14313 14313
IV
** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The first row gives coefficients on a 
dummy for reading the post.com in the last five weekdays. IV regressions instrument for post.com 
consumption with dummy variables for Internet access at work, fast Internet connection, and reported use 
of the Internet for research/education and work-related tasks. Overidentification test p value is the p value 
from a standard Sargan test. Other Internet news is a dummy for online news use other than online 
newspapers. Industry controls are dummies for twelve industry categories. Occupation controls are 
dummies for eleven occupation categories. All regressions include controls for Washington Times 
readership, age, sex, education (four categories), white-collar work, computer work, employment status, 
income, political party, date of survey, location of residence within the DMA (six categories), and dummy 
variables for the number of missing values. The regressions omit observations where print newspapers are 
not in the choice set (consumer reports that she generally reads no newspaper sections) and control for 
presence of online newspapers in the choice set (whether the consumer used the Internet in the last thirty 
days).Table 5
Parameter estimates from full model: observable characteristics
Post post.com Times
Age .661** -.545** .688**
(.0407) (.0628) (.122)
Female -.473** -.423** -3.20**
(.0921) (.148) (.344)
High school 1.95** 2.87** 1.29
(.214) (.633) (.856)
College 2.54** 4.03** 1.49
(.237) (.654) (.928)
Grad school 2.76** 4.16** 1.19
(.252) (.670) (.964)
Computer job  -.567* 1.22** .322
(.223) (.323) (.682)
White collar job -.447** .431* -.591
(.118) (.195) (.423)
Full-time -1.13** .935** -.044
(.141) (.227) (.450)
Log income .709** .217 .934**
(.0729) (.118) (.260)
Democrat .217** .326* -.027
(.099) (.163) (.346)
Republican -.193 -.0538 2.902**
(.119) (.193) (.408)
Constant 6.97** -1.54 -8.85**
(.852) (1.18) (1.91)
N 16179 16179 16179
** significant at 1%. * significant at 5%. Standard errors in parentheses. Details of the 
model are given in the text. Age is measured in units of ten years. High school, 
college, and graduate school are mutually exclusive categories. Computer and white-
collar job are dummies for reported occupations in these categories and are also 
mutually exclusive. Full-time is a dummy for full-time employment. Democrat and 
Republican indicate registered members of the parties. Additional model parameters 
are shown in table 6. Not shown in any table are dummies for the number of missing 
observations, location of the respondent's residence within DC, time dummies (in six 
month intervals), and having print and online papers in the choice set.Table 6
Parameter estimates from full model: other
Interaction terms Excluded variables (coefficient in utility of post.com)
Post-post.com -1.285** Internet at work 1.357**
(.2307) (.180)
Post-Times .0809 Fast connection .146
(.2479) (.193)
post.com-Times -1.231** Use for education-related .361
(.4832) (.212)





** significant at 1%. * significant at 5%. Standard errors in parentheses. The model also includes a third-
order interaction term for the Post-Times-post.com bundle which is not reported in the table. Fast connection 
indicates consumers with DSL, cable modem, or T1 connections at home. Use variables were responses to 
the question "In what ways do you use online services?"  
Table 7
Variance and covariance of consumer characteristics




Times 7.66 4.85 10.2




Times -1.17 5.19 86.1
Variance of τ unobservables 2.03
Variance of ε unobservables 1.64
The table shows the covariance of different componenets 
of utility at the estimated parameter values.Table 8
Impact of the online edition on demand for print
Case 1: Full model
Cross-price derivative 8,358
(1,436)
Change in print readership -26,822
(4,483)
Change in print profits -$5,466,846
(913,699)
Case 2: Model with observable characteristics only
Cross-price derivative -8,421
(752)
Change in print readership 25,655
(2,270)
Change in print profits $5,229,009
(462,771)
Case 3 Model with no heterogeneity
Cross-price derivative -16,143
(702)
Change in print readership 51,897
(2,254)
Change in print profits $10,577,720
(459,464)
Standard errors in parentheses. The table shows three measures of the online 
edition's impact. The cross-price derivative is the change in post.com 
readership when the Post's price is increased by $.10. Change in print 
readership and print profits are the total changes for the Post when the online 
edition is added to the choice set. The table shows the estimated values in 
three models. Case 1 is the estimates from the full model. Case 2 is a model 
with observable consumer characteristics but no unobservables other than the 
i.i.d. logit errors. Case 3 is a model with no observable or unobservable 
consumer heterogeneity except the i.i.d. logit errors. Table 9
Consumer surplus from the post.com
Per consumer as % of print 70.4%
Per consumer in $ per day $0.30
Total as % of print 16.0%
Total in $ per day $123,413
Total in $ per year $45,045,862
Standard error ($6,606,939)
The table shows the loss in consumer surplus that would result if the 
post.com was removed from the choice set. "Per consumer in $ per day" is 
the total daily loss divided by the number of post.com consumers. "Per 
consumer as % of print" is this value as a percentage of the total loss from 
removing the Post print edition from the choice set divided by the number 
of Post readers.
Table 10
Changes in readership when post.com is removed
Change in Post readership 26,822
Standard error (4,483)
Consumers who read post.com and Post 
Switch to outside good 17.2%
Switch to Post only 79.2%
Switch to other bundles 3.5%
Consumers who read post.com only
Switch to outside good 69.1%
Switch to Post only 27.1%
Switch to other bundles 3.7%
The table shows results from a counterfactual simulation where 
the post.com is removed from the choice set. The final rows show 
the distribution of new choices in the counterfactual by consumers 
whose observed choices were either the Post-post.com bundle or 
the post.com alone.Table 11
Producer surplus effects of the post.com
(Before accounting for post.com operating costs)
Δ Post Profit -$5,466,846
Δ Times Profit -$2,687,348
Total post.com Revenue $33,150,000
Δ Producer Surplus $24,995,806
Standard Error ($1,876,785)
The first two rows show changes in firm profits caused by adding 
the post.com to the choice set. The next row shows the estimated 
advertising revenue generated by the post.com (including consumers 
both inside and outside of DC). The producer surplus figure is the 
effect of the post.com on producer profits, before accounting for the 










Post Company Cross-Price Optimal Price Consumer Surplus
Surplus ($ mil) Derivative of post.com per Year ($ mil)
Actual estimates $27.68 8,358 $0.20 $45.05
Price = $.25 $27.83 8,598 $0.19 $43.79
Price = $.35 $27.53 8,131 $0.21 $46.31
Marginal cost = $.30 $27.38 7,916 $0.22 $47.56
Marginal cost = $.50 $27.99 8,853 $0.18 $42.53
Online revenue = $25m $19.53 8,342 $0.24 $45.13
Omit broadband variable $27.19 9,277 $0.21 $45.12
Only Post and post.com $31.52 8,683 $0.22 $47.15
The first row repeats the estimates from the actual model that were presented in tables 5-11. The next two rows 
vary the Post cover price used to derive the price coefficient. The following rows vary the value of the marginal 
cost used. The next row assumes a lower value for the post.com's advertising revenue. The next row omits the 
fast Internet connection variable that was earlier included in online utility and excluded from print utility. The 
final row displays estimates from a model with only the Post and the post.com (with the Times included in the 
outside good).
 